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Collective Liberty
Josh Blackman*
The story of our Constitution is a tale of two liberties: individual freedom and collective
freedom. The inherent tension between these two is well known. Judicial protection of
individual liberty inhibits the collective from freely arranging society through the
democratic process. In contrast, judicial protection of this collective freedom to structure
society may infringe on individual liberty, especially for those out of the mainstream.
Like a pendulum, over the last century, the rights of free speech and exercise have swung
between the individual and the collective, between right and left. This Article traces these
arcs from individual liberty to collective liberty, and back.
Historically, progressives tended to favor broad conceptions of individual rights with
respect to protecting unpopular speech and minority religious groups. Conservatives, in
contrast, often disfavored such rights to the extent they impeded the preservation of
traditional social norms and structuring society. In recent years there has been a reversal,
as the right has asserted the mantle of individual liberty against claims of governmental
intrusion into time-honored institutions. But for the left, a robust freedom of speech and
religion—no longer serving progressive causes of social justice and equality—can now
more easily be subordinated to what Justice Breyer referred to as “collective” liberty.
By looking at two controversial cases in this arena—McCutcheon v. FEC and Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores—this Article chronicles the juxtaposition of positions on the right
and left, between collective and individual views of rights. This Article concludes by
explaining what this means for the development of the First Amendment on the Roberts
Court, as freedom from government clashes with freedom by government.

* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston. I thank the attendees at the Yale
Law School Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, as well as Floyd Abrams, Jack Balkin, Katie
Eyer, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Rick Garnett, Rick Hasen, Adam Liptak, Tamara Piety, Andrew Tutt,
and many others.
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Introduction
The story of our Constitution is a tale of two liberties: individual
freedom and collective freedom. The inherent tension between these two
is well known. Judicial protection of individual liberty inhibits the
collective from freely arranging society through the democratic process.
In contrast, judicial protection of this collective freedom to structure
society may infringe on individual liberty, especially for those out of the
mainstream. This dynamic is particularly true for the First Amendment’s
guarantees of free speech and exercise. With respect to free speech, there
is a never-ending struggle between the protection of speech, and the
state’s efforts to police the social costs of those expressions. For the
freedom of exercise, the balance is struck between the state’s efforts to
evenhandedly apply the law, and still respect individual conscience.
For these rights, depending who and when you ask, it was the best of
times, it was the worst of times. Like a pendulum, over the last century
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they have swung between the individual and the collective. Free speech
started as a collective right that was protected so long as majoritarian
1
politics deemed that it promoted the goals of society. But soon, this right
evolved to one of individual liberty, where the speech was protected for
2
its own sake. Not because it served any higher democratic goals—and
3
often it was antiestablishment —but because the value of speech
4
outweighed its negative externalities. Yet, in recent years, as fears of the
5
harms from dangerous speech have grown, this pendulum is on the
6
precipice of swinging back toward “collective speech.”
The freedom of exercise has fallen through a more complicated
trajectory, yet it winds up in a similar position. Five decades ago, free
exercise emerged to protect religious minorities from the democratic
process that did not sanction, and indeed imposed, a “substantial
7
burden” on their beliefs. But this pendulum eventually swung to the
other side when the Supreme Court held that it was up to the political
process to provide special protections for specific faiths, and not the First
8
Amendment. That same political process quickly tugged the pendulum
back toward the individual; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
provided that free exercise of religion could not be substantially
9
burdened, even through the application of laws of general applicability.
However, as the government reached its arm further into faith, the
beneficiaries of this law trended away from those of minority faiths, to
those of mainstream faiths. Today, the robust protection of free
exercise—that only recently enjoyed overwhelming support—is poised to
swing back toward the collective: faith is protected so long as it does not
10
interfere with the state’s broader goals of equality and social justice.
This Article traces the arcs from individual liberty to collective
liberty, and back. Historically, progressives tended to favor broad
conceptions of individual rights, with respect to protecting unpopular

1. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
216–17 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 51–52 (1919).
2. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
4. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2734 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
5. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2771 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
6. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408–10 (1963).
8. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 (1990).
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4).
10. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805–06 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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speech and minority religious groups. Conservatives, in contrast, often
opposed such rights to the extent they impeded the preservation of
traditional social norms and structures. In recent years there has been a
reversal, as the right has claimed the mantle of individual liberty against
claims of governmental intrusion into their time-honored institutions.
But for the left, a robust freedom of speech and religion—no longer
serving progressive causes of social justice—can now more easily be
11
subordinated to the “generalized conception of the public good.” This
Article provides a framework to understand the reversal of these values.
Part I contrasts individual speech and collective speech through the
lens of McCutcheon v. FEC. In McCutcheon, Justice Breyer’s dissent
referred to the freedom of speech, not only as the “individual’s right to
engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a
12
democratic order in which collective speech matters.” This notion of a
“collective” First Amendment was emphatically rejected by the majority
opinion, which explained that “the First Amendment safeguards an
individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political
13
expression and political association.” Chief Justice Roberts retorted,
“there are compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First
Amendment by reference to such a generalized conception of the public
14
good.”
With respect to speech, modern-day liberalism seems to be drifting
away from protecting individual freedom, and more toward
constitutionally guaranteeing equality. As Floyd Abrams opined, the
dissent offers a very troubling vision of free expression that is “deeply
15
disquieting.” The progressive preference for collective liberty is evident
in the ACLU’s decision not to file a brief in McCutcheon, reflecting a
long-simmering divide among its members. In contrast, conservatives
seized on expanded speech rights to repel this creeping control. The
McCutcheon opinions, and their supporting briefs, signal a shifting trend
in progressive and conservative thought on the First Amendment and
individual liberty more generally.
Part II contrasts individual exercise and collective exercise through
the lens of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. In this case, we witnessed a
reorientation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).
Introduced in Congress by Senator Ted Kennedy and then-Representative
Chuck Schumer, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1993,

11. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
12. Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 1448 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 1449 (emphasis added).
15. Floyd Abrams, Symposium: Opposing More Speech—A Disturbing and Recurring Reality,
SCOTUSBlog (Apr. 4, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-opposingmore-speech-a-disturbing-recurring-reality/.
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RFRA was crafted as a bipartisan legislative override of Justice Scalia’s
16
unpopular decision in Employment Division v. Smith. The law was
perhaps intended as a shield to protect religious minorities, such as
Native Americans who use sacramental peyote, from laws that infringe
on their exercise. Fast forward two decades, and RFRA is now wielded
as a sword to enforce the religious identities of corporations that cannot
be burdened by the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) contraceptives
mandate. In her dissent in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg highlighted
the divide, focusing on how the Court’s accommodation of the religious
liberties of Hobby Lobby would have an impact on “thousands of
17
women . . . who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith.”
For Ginsburg, the collective needs of society for covered contraception
easily trumped religious liberty. The majority opinion, which begrudgingly
assumed that employee-provided insurance for contraception was a
compelling interest, viewed the calculus entirely backwards.
Part III charts the progression of speech and exercise on both the
right and the left by posing three questions: Who is benefiting? Who is
harmed? What is the purpose of the right? In the past, liberal justices
have offered robust protection for free speech and exercise rights when
the beneficiaries were the proverbial “have-nots.” Today, the scenario
has reversed as conservatives offer strong protections for the speech and
exercise rights of the “haves.” Contrast the hippie wearing a “Fuck the
Draft” jacket with the millionaire donor Shaun McCutcheon. Or the
Seventh-Day Adventist who could not work on Saturday with Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. that refused to cover certain contraceptives for female
employees. A corollary to the beneficiary of the right is who bears the
cost. Earlier cases offered easy and cheap accommodations, such as
providing unemployment benefits to the Seventh-Day Adventist. Hobby
Lobby presents a different calculus, where the cost is borne by female
employees who would not receive coverage for contraceptives. This
Article closes by looking at the recent debate over Indiana’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which serves as a harbinger for the growing
18
debate between liberty and equality in the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges.
I do not attempt to create a unifying theory of the First
Amendment, nor do I try to explain all of this century’s developments in
free speech and exercise doctrine. Rather, by looking at two of the most
recent and controversial cases in this arena—McCutcheon v. FEC and
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—this Article chronicles the juxtaposition of
positions for collective and individual views of rights. This Article
addresses what these changes mean for the development of the First

16. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or., 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
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Amendment on the Roberts Court, as freedom from government clashes
with freedom by government.
I. Collective Speech
The divide between individual and collective speech—though a
battle that has been waged for nearly a century—was crystallized by the
dueling opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC between Justice Breyer and
Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Breyer’s dissent relies on progressive-era
precedents, bolstered by dubious founding-era sources, to make the case
that the First Amendment was designed to promote “democracy” through
19
“collective speech.” The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, counters
that the First Amendment protects an individual right, independent of its
20
utilitarian value. The majority and dissent represent the newly drawn
battle lines, where conservatives now claim the mantle that “speech is
speech,” and liberals support the power of the state to restrict speech that
is not necessary to “democracy.” As reflected by the evolving position of
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) on campaign finance
reform, the sands of the First Amendment continue to shift, while both sides
dig into their trenches.
A. MCCUTCHEON V. FEC
McCutcheon v. FEC considered the constitutionality of the annual
contribution aggregate limit for individuals of “$123,200 to candidate and
21
noncandidate committees during each two-year election cycle.” Though
22
often dubbed in the media as the sequel to Citizens United v. FEC, the
case had nothing to do with corporate speech. It involved an individual,
Shaun McCutcheon, who sought to contribute to more candidates that
23
the aggregate limit cap allowed.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court per Chief Justice Roberts found “that
the aggregate limits do little, if anything, to . . . [combat corruption],
24
while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process.” As a
result, “[t]he aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First
25
Amendment.” This 5-4 split was effectively the same breakdown that

19. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467.
20. Id. at 1438.
21. Id. at 1443.
22. Josh Voorhees, SCOTUS Strikes down Aggregate Campaign Donor Limits, Slate (Apr. 2,
2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/04/02/scotus_donor_limit_case_high_court_s_
mccutcheon_opinion_strikes_down_the.html.
23. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434.
24. Id. at 1442.
25. Id.
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fractured the Court with Citizens United four years earlier, with Justice
26
Kagan donning the robe of the now-retired Justice Stevens.
Penning the dissent on behalf of the liberal bloc of the Court was
Justice Breyer. The dissent would have upheld the aggregate limits in
recognition of the “importance of protecting the political integrity of our
27
governmental institutions.” Mincing no words, Justice Breyer concluded
that “[t]aken together with Citizens United, today’s decision eviscerates
our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of
dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws
28
were intended to resolve.” None of this should have come as any
surprise in light of the divide in Citizens United. But then a funny thing
29
happened on the way to campaign finance utopia. In justifying the
aggregate limit, the First Amendment was whittled down from an individual
right to a collective privilege. Justice Breyer referred to the freedom of
speech, not only as an “individual’s right to engage in political speech,
but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which
30
collective speech matters.” A careful examination of Justice Breyer’s
opinion reveals a subtle, but deliberate framework to reorient the freedom
of expression and civil liberties writ large.
1.

Justice Breyer’s Progressive Throwback

The dissent’s analysis begins innocuously enough: “Consider at least
31
one reason why the First Amendment protects political speech.” Breyer
32
adds “[s]peech does not exist in a vacuum.” Though described as “not a
new idea,” these two understated sentences from the usually verbose
33
Breyer would effect a revolution in First Amendment jurisprudence. By
bifurcating “political” speech from “nonpolitical” speech, and stressing
that speech need not exist for its own sake, Breyer extracts the fragile
golden spike that united the Promontory Point of the First Amendment.
For the dissent, speech is to be judged based on its character and utility
for greater social goods, such as democracy.
To justify this bold departure from modern First Amendment
jurisprudence, Breyer dials back the First Amendment not to the heyday
of the Warren and Burger Courts—the apogee of free speech
protections—but to the Progressive Era. First, Justice Breyer pays

26. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010). Coincidentally, Citizens United was the first
case Solicitor General Kagan argued and Justice Sotomayor heard.
27. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. T. Dan Smith: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Utopia (Amber et al. 1987).
30. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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homage to the crown prince of this epoch, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. What is the utility of “political” speech for Breyer? The First
Amendment protects “political communication [that] seeks to secure
34
government action.” For “[a] politically oriented ‘marketplace of ideas’
seeks to form a public opinion that can and will influence elected
35
representatives.” This adaptation of the oft-cited Justice Holmes’
phrase “marketplace of ideas”—though limited to ideas of the political
variety—restores a utilitarian vision of free speech that had lapsed into
desuetude. Presumably, “political” speech that does not contribute to the
“marketplace of ideas” and should not be used to “secure government
action” is outside the Constitution’s protections.
Curiously, Justice Breyer does not cite the source of the
“marketplace of ideas”—Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United
36
States. Why? Because Holmes’s then-revolutionarily robust vision of the
First Amendment is incompatible with Breyer’s stingy view of speech. In
1919, Holmes wrote that the “ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
37
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” This
38
sentence could have been pulled from Shaun McCutcheon’s merit brief.
But this is not the “theory of our Constitution” that the McCutcheon
dissenters endorse—they could not even bring themselves to cite it!
Next, the dissent turns to Holmes’ free speech protégé, Justice Louis
39
Brandeis. He wrote “[e]ighty-seven years ago” the “First Amendment’s
40
protection of speech was ‘essential to effective democracy.’” But this
too cherry picks from Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v.
41
California. The complete sentence Breyer omits reads: “Moreover, even
imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively
42
serious.” The essence of this statement was that speech cannot be
limited unless it is “imminent[ly] dangerous” and “relatively serious.”
Not that “political speech” can be limited when it is unnecessary to
“secure government action” or that speech was protected because it was

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Burt Neuborne, Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment 88 (2015).
39. See Thomas Healy, The Great Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His
Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America (2013).
40. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
41. 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
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43

“essential to effective democracy.” In contrast to Breyer’s assertion,
Brandeis writes that the “[p]rohibition of free speech and assembly is a
measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for
44
averting a relatively trivial harm to society.” Brandeis’ vision of the
First Amendment was premised on “respect for the inherent dignity of
the speaker as a human being [that] requires us to tolerate efforts at selfexpression, even when they do not help our choice-dependent institutions to
45
work better.” Individual speech is protected regardless of whether it
makes democracy work.
The dissent then turns to Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion in
46
Stromberg v. California. This case reversed a prosecution for flying a
47
red flag as a symbol of “opposition to organized government.” Here is
how Justice Breyer quotes the opinion: “‘A fundamental principle of our
constitutional system’ is the ‘maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
48
will of the people.’” The dissent emphasized “to the end,” stressing the
utilitarian nature of this speech. But what rendered the California law
unconstitutional? It was, Chief Justice Hughes found, “so vague and
indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity
[for free political discussion and] is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty
49
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Not that the speech was only
valid so long as it served “the end” that “government may be responsive”
to, but that the statute cannot sweep so broadly to prohibit speech that
may be useful to this end. Justice Breyer swings and misses with his
citations to both Holmes and Brandeis, and strikes out with Hughes.
Even so, the decision to dial back to the Progressive Era marks a
bold departure from recent First Amendment jurisprudence. As Professor
David Bernstein points out:
[O]nce one adopts the Progressive view of freedom of speech as only
going so far as to protect the public interest in a well-functioning
marketplace of ideas, there is no obvious reason to limit reduced
scrutiny of government ‘public interest’ regulation of speech to campaign
finance regulations. Nor is it obvious why the Court should give strict
scrutiny to speech restrictions that don’t directly affect the marketplace

43. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
45. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 8.
46. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
47. Id. at 363.
48. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369
(emphasis added)).
49. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
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of ideas, instead of just using a malleable test balancing ‘speech interests’
50
versus other interests.

If the precedents of the Warren Court concerning the First
Amendment no longer ground the Justices, then Breyer’s “collective
speech” goes much further than campaign finance laws.
2. The Dissent’s Faulty Originalism
After reimagining the views of Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes,
Breyer turns back the clock further to Madison, Wilson, and Rousseau.
51
Breyer begins by citing the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to explain
that the “Framers had good reason to emphasize this same connection
52
between political speech and governmental action.” Breyer observed
that Rousseau “argued that in a representative democracy, the people
lose control of their representatives between elections, during which
53
interim periods they were ‘in chains.’” Citing absolutely no evidence
that the Framers ever even considered this statement, Breyer states that
54
“[t]he Framers responded to this criticism.” He offers two methods that
the Framers apparently employed to respond to this problem. (There is
no evidence that the Framers were ever aware of either approach.) The
55
first method was “requiring frequent elections to federal office.” There

50. David Bernstein, Breyer’s Dangerous Dissent in McCutcheon (the Campaign Finance Case),
Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/02/
breyers-dangerous-dissent-in-mccutcheon-the-campaign-finance-case/.
51. Justice Breyer refers to Rousseau as “[a]n influential 18th-century continental philosopher,”
but offers no evidence to support the conclusion that Rousseau had any influence on the framing
generation or American constitutional jurisprudence more broadly. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467
(Breyer, J., dissenting). A search revealed only a single citation to Rousseau in the U.S. Reports, and it
had no connection with founding-era thoughts on constitutional law. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2753 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)
(“Blackstone—whose works constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding
generation . . . .”); Steven Menashi, Cain as His Brother’s Keeper: Property Rights and Christian
Doctrine in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 185 (2012) (noting the
influence of John Locke on American property law).
52. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (citing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Social Contract
265–66 (transl. 1791)). This exact quote from Rousseau appears in Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided:
Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution 8 (2014) in a chapter titled “A Short History of
Representation and Discursive Democracy.” When McCutcheon was decided on April 2, 2014, this
book was not yet released. The book authored by the Yale Law School Dean was released on June 23,
2014. Yet, Breyer still cited the book. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As
discussed infra, Breyer also referenced Post’s book without citation in several other places. See Josh
Blackman, Talk About Citing Facts Outside the Record! Justice Breyer Cites Unpublished Book in
McCutcheon Dissent, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Apr. 19, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/04/19/
talk-about-citing-facts-outside-the-record-justice-breyer-cites-unpublished-book-in-mccutcheon-dissent/.
54. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course, Dean Post makes an
identical point in his book. Post, supra note 53, at 8 (“The answer to Rousseau’s challenge was to
forge a living connection between the people and their representatives.”).
55. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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is no further elaboration of how Senators, who served terms of six years,
rather than two years, without any election by the people, fit within this
mold. Second, Breyer explains, the Framers achieved this goal by “by
56
enacting a First Amendment.” Also, there is no explanation that the
First Amendment was not part of the original Constitution, and as the
Court has recognized, the structural provisions of our Constitution
operate to protect liberty even if the Bill of Rights had never been
57
ratified.
Citing the Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of
America, Breyer explains that the First Amendment “would facilitate a
‘chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom they
58
have committed the exercise of the powers of government.’” This is a
misleading mischaracterization of Wilson’s 1792 lecture on the
Constitution. As Professor John McGinnis points out, Wilson’s comment
59
had absolutely nothing to do with the First Amendment, for it was not
free speech, but “representation” that would be the “chain of
60
communication between the people.” McGinnis observes that Wilson
was discussing “the novelty and virtue of representative government, as
opposed to ‘monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical’ forms of
61
government.”
Worse still is that Wilson was making the exact opposite point that
Breyer cited it for. In the very next sentence, Wilson stated, “This chain
may consist of one or more links; but in all cases it should be sufficiently
62
strong and discernible.” As Dean Robert Post accurately notes in the
original source Breyer relied on, “The chain of communication needed to
be ‘sufficiently strong and discernible’ to sustain the popular conviction
that representatives spoke for the people whom they purported to
represent. Only in this way could the value of self-government be
63
maintained.” McGinnis explains, “In the context of discussing the
nature of electoral representation, Wilson posits that representation may
be direct (one vote between the people and choice of representative) but
may also be indirect like the Constitution’s own establishment of the
electoral college (at least two votes between the people and the choice of
64
representative).” Rather than establishing a direct and accountable

56. Id.
57. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
58. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing James Wilson & Thomas
McKean, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of America 30–31 (1792)).
59. John O. McGinnis, Justice Breyer Needs an Originalist Law Clerk, Libr. of L. & Liberty (Apr.
6, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/04/06/justice-breyer-needs-an-originalist-law-clerk/.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Wilson, supra note 58, at 31.
63. Post, supra note 53, at 8 (emphasis added).
64. McGinnis, supra note 59.
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democracy, our Constitution imposes many layers of separation between
elected branches and the electorate—totally orthogonal from Breyer’s
“democratic” vision of the First Amendment.
Breyer next trains his sights on James Madison. Citing The
Federalist No. 57, Breyer writes, “[t]his ‘chain’ would establish the
necessary ‘communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments’ between
the people and their representatives, so that public opinion could be
65
channeled into effective governmental action.” This citation is
confounding for several reasons. First, Breyer attempts to tie together an
out-of-context statement Wilson made in 1792 with a phrase Madison
never used, in a Federalist paper authored five years earlier. Second, this
statement was made before the ratification of the Constitution, let alone
the Bill of Rights. Third, and most importantly, Madison’s comments,
like Wilson’s, have nothing to do with the First Amendment. In The
Federalist No. 57, Madison was not talking about free speech, or even
democracy, but the fact that the House of Representatives “can make no
law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends,
66
as well as on the great mass of the society.” In other words, everything
Congress does will impact society. Indeed, Madison’s answer to this
problem was not democracy but liberty: “the vigilant and manly spirit
which actuates the people of America—a spirit which nourishes freedom,
67
and in return is nourished by it.”
At the end of a string citation, Breyer references several quotes
from James Madison during the debates over what became the First
68
Amendment, writing that the Amendment “will strengthen American
democracy by giving ‘the people’ a right to ‘publicly address their
representatives,’ ‘privately advise them,’ or ‘declare their sentiments by
69
petition to the whole body.’” Again it seems that Breyer used these
70
quotations from Dean Post’s book, but entirely disregarded their context.
Madison made these comments in response to a proposal to include “a
right of instruction,” that provided, “the people should have a right to
71
instruct their representatives.” In other words, the people could tell their
representatives how to vote, similar to how the states could instruct and

65. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing The
Federalist No. 57, at 386 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
66. The Federalist No. 57, supra note 65, at 386 (James Madison).
67. Id. at 387.
68. It was the third proposed Amendment.
69. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas Hart Benton,
1 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 141 (1857)).
70. Post, supra note 53, at 12–13.
71. Id.
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recall representatives under the late Articles of Confederation. Madison
rejected this proposal, and argued that there was no need to specify a
“right of instruction” because of the wide-ranging protections of what
73
became the First Amendment. It gave “the people . . . a right to express
and communicate their sentiments and wishes. . . . The right of freedom
of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be
beyond the reach of this Government; the people may therefore publicly
address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their
74
sentiments by petition to the whole body.”
Madison explained that the multifaceted protections of liberty
ensured that the people could communicate with their representatives.
There was no need to specify a “right of instruction.” It is in this sense,
Post writes, that “the First Amendment established a chain of
75
communication that would connect the people to their representatives,”
and not in the narrow sense Breyer describes. As McGinnis explains,
“Madison is actually arguing against a provision that would have
required representatives to reflect more closely the sentiments of the
people, thus undercutting Justice Breyer’s point that the government’s
representatives may regulate expression to make what they claim is a
76
closer connection between them and their constituents.” Once again,
the history Breyer cherry picks proves just the opposite point. In 1792,
the year after the First Amendment was ratified, James Madison
explained the divide between these two schools of freedom. “In Europe,
77
charters of liberty [have been] granted by power.” But in America,
78
Madison counters, “charters of power have been granted by liberty.”
Speech was not designed to serve democracy—speech preexisted and
exists independently of democracy. Democracy exists because of speech,
not the other way around.
Following this topsy-turvy magical mystery tour of the First
Amendment, Justice Breyer finishes with a jarring, and unjustified
conclusion: “Accordingly, the First Amendment advances not only the
individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also the public’s
interest in preserving a democratic order in which collective speech
79
matters.” No such assertion was proven. The dissent adduced not a
scintilla of evidence that this was how the First Amendment was ever

72. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. V (“[W]ith a power reserved to each state, to recall
its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the
remainder of the Year.”).
73. The Federalist No. 57, supra note 65, at 385 (James Madison).
74. Post, supra note 53, at 13.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. McGinnis, supra note 59.
77. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 55 (1992).
78. Id.
79. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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understood. A thorough search failed to discover a single instance where
the phrase “collective speech” was ever used in the U.S. Reports. While
this may be a salient and contemporary progressive vision of the First
Amendment—one embraced by several prominent ACLU alumni—
attempts to support it based on the Court’s precedents, and even the
founding generation’s views on democracy, are entirely lacking. Even Burt
Neuborne, who agrees with Breyer’s approach to the First Amendment,
charitably describes his theory as justified by only an “emerging intuition,”
80
rather than the “text itself.”
3. Active Liberty and “Collective Liberty”
On the merits, “collective speech” fares no better. To the McCutcheon
dissenters, what determines if “political speech” is protected is whether it
81
“preserv[es] a democratic order” for the “collective” good. Traditionally, a
lot of speech may serve individualistic ends, and under strict scrutiny, it is
the government’s burden to show why a compelling interest exists to
limit that expression. It is not the individual’s burden to show that her
expression is made pursuant to some nebulously defined common good.
But the McCutcheon dissent turns this analysis on its head. Rather
than protecting speech, the “collective” campaign finance laws, Breyer
82
explains, “strengthen, rather than weaken” the First Amendment. They
83
“create a democracy responsive to the people.” The dissent even goes
so far as to suggest that the First Amendment favors “the expression” of
ideas that “reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments” of the
84
people, rather than speech that is at odds with that consensus. To this
view, the First Amendment exists to ensure that all voices can be heard
equally, not that an individual can speak. This “collective” right—better
85
termed a power —permits the state to limit speech to ensure that others
can be heard.
At the end of the analysis, Breyer attempts to limit the breadth of
his dissent by noting the “potential for conflict between” the fact that
“contributions” are needed to “pay for the diffusion of ideas,” and the
“need to limit” those contributions “in order to help maintain the integrity

80. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 178.
81. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1468.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80 (2008) (“Three provisions of the
Constitution refer to ‘the people’ in a context other than ‘rights’—the famous preamble (‘We the
people’), section 2 of Article I (providing that ‘the people’ will choose members of the House), and the
Tenth Amendment (providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with ‘the
States’ or ‘the people’). Those provisions arguably refer to ‘the people’ acting collectively—but they
deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights. Nowhere else in the Constitution does a
‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”).
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of the electoral process.” Yet Breyer’s preceding analysis makes clear
how that cookie crumbles—the democratic process can trump any
individualistic political expression that falls outside of “collective speech.”
These collective ideals are not novel for the former Harvard Law
School professor. Active Liberty, Breyer’s 2007 tome, explains that the
First Amendment is “designed to further a basic constitutional purpose:
86
creating and maintaining democratic decision-making institutions.”
Expressions inconsistent with that goal are deemed second-class
utterances. Breyer explained in a 2006 interview that the most important
87
part of the Constitution was “basically about . . . democracy,”
notwithstanding the fact that “the word democracy is nowhere to be
88
found in either the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence.”
To Breyer, “strong free speech guarantees” would “require, depriving
the people of the democratically necessary room to make decisions,
89
including the leeway to make regulatory mistakes.”
While McCutcheon primarily concerned so-called “political” speech,
Breyer’s collectivist mentality is not so limited, but also extends to
speech about “economic” or “social” matters. For the types of expression
that warrant “especially strong pro-speech judicial presumptions” and
“careful review” are those that “shape public opinion, particularly if that
opinion in turn will affect the political process and the kind of society in
90
which we live.” Other types of speech that do not serve democracy are
not so fortunate.
Breyer’s “solution” to the campaign finance problem requires us to
“understand” the First Amendment “as protecting more than the
individual’s modern freedom,” but as “seeking to facilitate a conversation
among ordinary citizens that will encourage their informed participation
91
in the electoral process.” That is, a collective right (or power), rather
than an individual right. It is not about “protecting the individual from
government restriction of information about matters that the
Constitution commits to individual, not collective, decision-making,” but
rather as “seeking primarily to encourage the exchange of information
and ideas necessary for citizens themselves to shape” the “democratic
92
state.” In other words, the First Amendment treats less favorably
speech that affects individuals than speech that promotes “democracy.”

86. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 39 (2005).
87. Interview by Robert P. George, Professor, Princeton Univ., with Justice Stephen Breyer, in
Princeton, N.J. (Apr. 30, 2006).
88. Timothy Sandefur, The Conscience of the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence and the Right to Liberty 5 (2014).
89. Breyer, supra note 86, at 41.
90. Id. at 42.
91. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 47 (emphasis added); see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 245, 252–53 (2002).
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With this framework, Justice Breyer tries to strike a balance between
providing too strong of speech protection, which would “prevent a
93
democratically elected government from creating necessary regulation,”
and too weak of speech protection, which would not allow for the “free
94
exchange of ideas necessary to maintain the health of our democracy.”
This balancing test, which seeks to strike that happy middle ground—not
too hot and not too cold—is less Goldilocks and more Janus. Both sides
of the equation serve the same master: protecting speech that promotes
democracy. If judicial protections of speech are too strong, the collective
speech rights of society to promote democracy are hampered. If judicial
protections of speech are too weak, the political speech rights of
individuals to promote democracy are hampered. Both routes wind up at
the same destination, and require judges to pick and choose what types
of speech are consistent or inconsistent with democracy.
4. The Conservatives Strike Back
Responding forcefully and vigorously to Breyer’s “collective
speech” vision of the First Amendment, ironically, was the conservative
bloc of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito. Even more paradoxically, draping themselves in the
First Amendment as interpreted by the Warren Court were the Justices
who came of age seeking to roll back that generation of jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Roberts begins his analysis by citing Cohen v. California,
a case where the Court upheld the right of a person in courthouse to wear
a jacket blaring “Fuck the Draft.” The First Amendment, Roberts explains,
“is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
95
voiced largely into the hands of each of us” as individuals. It represents
“the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
96
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”
The First Amendment protects not a “collective” power of society, but
“an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political
97
expression and political association.” Stressing this point, Roberts
repeats, “[g]overnment may not penalize an individual for ‘robustly
98
exercis[ing]’ his First Amendment rights.” The word “individual” is
repeated throughout to emphasize the contrast.

93.
94.
95.
(1971)).
96.
97.
98.

Breyer, supra note 86, at 41.
Id. at 42.
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
Id. at 1448 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1449 (emphasis added) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)).
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After establishing that the aggregate limits were inconsistent with
the First Amendment, Roberts directly engages with Breyer’s dissent:
“[t]he dissent faults this focus on ‘the individual’s right to engage in
political speech, saying that it fails to take into account ‘the public’s
99
interest’ in ‘collective speech.’” Not so, Roberts explains: “there are
compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First Amendment
100
by reference to such a generalized conception of the public good.” The
majority proceeds to dismantle, one plank at a time, the basis for
Breyer’s communal freedom.
First, the Court explains that democracy enforces the “will of the
101
majority.” In this way, the democratic “‘collective speech’ . . . plainly
can include laws that restrict free speech” to the extent the expression
102
conflicts with majority will. If the democratic process deems speech
unnecessary, “collective speech” would allow the state to eliminate the
speech. The First Amendment, Roberts counters, exists to “afford
individuals protection against such infringements,” not to “protect the
103
The First
government” when it “reflect[s] ‘collective speech.’”
Amendment does not operate as an instrumental tool to protect
deliberations, but is designed as a restraint on government itself. Speech
104
is a personal, not a shared, right. In response to Breyer’s collective
speech, free speech icon Floyd Abrams similarly notes that,
[T]he core First Amendment interest is that of protecting freedom of
expression from the government. Relegating that to a subsidiary
position behind permitting the government, in the name of advancing
democracy, to limit the amount of speech about who to105vote for, risks
much that the First Amendment was adopted to protect.

Second, the value of speech should in no way be tethered to a
“legislative or judicial determination that [it] is useful to the democratic

99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (contrasting against United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). See Timothy Sandefur,
Wow, Talk About Getting It Backwards, FreeSpace (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://sandefur.typepad.
com/freespace/2014/04/wow-talk-about-getting-it-backwards.html.
104. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008) (“The unamended Constitution and
the Bill of Rights use the phrase ‘right of the people’ two other times, in the First Amendment’s
Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth
Amendment uses very similar terminology (‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people’). All three of these
instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be
exercised only through participation in some corporate body.”).
105. Ronald K.L. Collins, Guest Contributor—Floyd Abrams, “Liberty Is Liberty,” Concurring
Opinions (Mar. 18, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/03/guest-contributor-floydabrams-liberty-is-liberty.html.

Blackman-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

640

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2016 10:18 PM

[Vol. 67:623

106

process.” Citing the Court’s recent 8-1 decision in United States v.
Stevens—invalidating a federal law that prohibited depictions of animal
cruelty—the Chief Justice restated that the “First Amendment does not
107
contemplate such ‘ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’”
Or, as the Court stated a decade earlier, “‘[w]hat the Constitution says is
that’ value judgments ‘are for the individual to make, not for the
108
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.’”
Or, as the Court stated four decades earlier, “[t]he constitutional protection
[of speech] does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of
109
the ideas and beliefs which are offered.” Speech cannot be restricted
because the democratically elected majority thinks some things are better
off not said.
Third, the Court notes that our First Amendment jurisprudence
“already takes account of any ‘collective’ interest that may justify
restrictions on individual speech” by measuring any restrictions on
110
speech “against the asserted public interest.” Ceding the dissent’s
conclusion, the Chief Justice notes combating “corruption in the
111
electoral process” is “no doubt . . . compelling.” But this is only part of
the equation. The Court must also determine whether the restriction on
speech is sufficiently narrowly tailored, or if it has substantial negative
112
social costs to others. Otherwise, the regulation is presumptively
invalid. The validity of prior restraints is the rare exception to the rule,
not the norm. Congress can “pursue that interest only so long as it does
not unnecessarily infringe an individual’s right to freedom of speech; [the
113
Court does] not truncate this tailoring test at the outset.” Unlike the
Janused scales of the dissent, burdened by the presumption of
constitutionality, the equipoise struck by the majority exudes the
114
presumption of liberty.
Abrams observes that a “battle . . . rages in academia and on the
Supreme Court as to what the First Amendment is all about. And in that
conflict . . . it is the ideological Left that seems increasingly less
supportive of the First Amendment—or, to put it more fairly, to more
115
speech or speech-like activity being protected by the First Amendment.”

106. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
107. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
108. Id. at 1449–50 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
109. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
445 (1963)) (emphasis added).
110. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.
111. Id. at 1451. The Chief Justice was more willing to combat potential corruption in judicial
elections. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015).
112. See Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 951 (2011).
113. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (emphasis added).
114. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004).
115. Collins, supra note 105.
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“The division between the Roberts and Breyer opinions,” Abrams notes,
116
“is vast.” There is no doubt that “jurists on both sides of the divide care
117
about both freedom of speech and democracy.” However, “only one
side believes that the best protection of democracy is more rather than
118
less speech.” This, Abrams concludes, “is a disturbing and recurring
119
reality.”
From the other perspective, Professor Neuborne (more from him
120
later), highlights the “heated exchange between” Roberts and Breyer.
He observes that “under current constitutional ground rules American
judges confronted with a case having significant implications for the
functioning of American democracy are not required—indeed, they may
not even be permitted—to ask whether the outcome is good or bad for
121
democracy.” Whereas Breyer grounds his opinion entirely in making
democracy work, Roberts will not deign to even consider the
ramifications of his decisions, placing his faith in the mantra that more
speech will lead to the optimal outcome, whatever that may be. This
obtuseness, or perhaps what the dissent might characterize as naïveté,
highlights the growing divide within the First Amendment.
B. The Shifting First Amendment
The “collective speech” dissent in McCutcheon should not have
come as a surprise. Over the past two decades, fissures have formed in
the First Amendment, so much so that the most zealous defenders of free
speech are now conservatives, and the largest critics have become
liberals. Crystallizing this fracture has been the ACLU. After a bitterly
divided internal vote, the ACLU at long last embraced regulations on
speech once unthinkable by the premier civil liberties organization. The
story of this change is a microcosm for how our First Amendment has
shifted.
1.

The Divide in the ACLU

For a century, the ACLU has stood at the vanguard of protecting
civil liberties, and in particular the freedom of speech. Consider “the late
1950s and 1960s,” a period in which the “foundation for the modern First
122
Amendment” was laid by the Warren Court. During this era, the
organization, and the First Amendment more broadly, enjoyed breathtaking
successes, and the landmark First Amendment cases came, fast and furious.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Abrams, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Neuborne, supra note 38, at 74.
Id.
Id. at 111.
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123

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court found that “public
officials” had to prove “actual malice” in order to sue a newspaper for
libel. The state’s interest in protecting the reputation of public figures
was subordinated to the right of individuals to criticize government
officials. In Tinker v. Des Moines School Board, the Court found that
students could not be punished for wearing a black armband as a protest
against the Vietnam War unless it results in a “substantial disruption” to
124
school activities. Even in an institution where discipline and order are
paramount, the Court sided with the individual student’s right of
expression. In Cohen v. California, the Justices extended First
Amendment protections to the right to wear in a courthouse a jacket
125
bearing the message, “Fuck the Draft.” The state was no longer even
able to impose a sense of decorum for collective order in—of all places—
a courthouse. “The majority made it clear that an involuntary hearer’s
interest in being shielded from offensive speech cannot be deemed a
126
compelling interest justifying government censorship.” The individual’s
right to speak prevailed. (I wonder how the present-day Supreme Court
would treat an attendee wearing the exact same jacket at One First
127
Street. ) One of the few outliers in this series was United States v.
O’Brien, where the Court held that a war protestor could be prosecuted
for burning his draft card, as the federal government’s interest in
maintaining an effective selective service draft system trumped the
128
individual right.

123. 376 U.S. 250, 283 (1964).
124. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
125. 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971).
126. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 112.
127. In oral arguments in Cohen v. California, Chief Justice Burger instructed counsel for
petitioner, Mel Nimmer: “Mr. Nimmer, you may proceed whenever you’re ready. I might suggest to
you that . . . the Court’s thoroughly familiar with the factual setting of this case and it will not be
necessary for you, I’m sure, to dwell on the facts.” Transcript of Oral Argument, Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 215 (1971) (No. 299). His admonition to avoid cursing did not work as Nimmer said “fuck”
roughly two minutes into his argument. Id. In stark contrast, in the 2008 oral arguments for Fox v.
FCC, which considered whether the FCC could issue a fine for Bono, who said during a live broadcast
“really, really fucking brilliant,” unfolded without expletives. During arguments, the advocates shied
away from saying the actual word at the Supreme Court. Though, as Dahlia Lithwick recalls, the lawyers
and judges “swore like sailors when this case was argued in the 2nd Circuit.” Dahlia Lithwick, Shit Doesn’t
Happen, Slate (Nov. 4, 2008, 6:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_
court_dispatches/2008/11/shit_doesnt_happen.html. The closest Solicitor General Gregory Garre came to
profanity was to suggest the Court had a role to stop “Big Bird dropping the F-bomb on Sesame
Street.” Lithwick wryly observed, “it’s a bitterly disappointing day for those of us who’d looked
forward to hearing some filthy words at the high court.” Id. In a related prudish moment from Fox v.
FCC II, involving the broadcast of “buttocks” on television, former-Solicitor General Seth Waxman
pointed out that there was nudity in the Court’s frieze. “There’s a bare buttock there, and there’s a
bare buttock here. I had never focused on it before.” Justice Scalia replied, “Me neither.” Joan Biskupic, Top
Justices Grapple with FCC Filters on Cursing, Nudity, USA Today (Jan. 1, 2012, 1:55 AM), http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/story/2012-01-10/supreme-court-broadcast-indecency/52482854/1.
128. 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
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Neuborne dubs this period “the First Amendment era of good
feelings” where the “right’s newly minted dedication to an expansive
Free Speech clause was added to the reformist left’s longtime
129
preoccupation with free speech.” What was the tipping point of this
Pax Supremana? Neuborne charts its ascent from the “1960s with the
civil rights movement and reaching its apogee in the 1989 and 1990 flag130
131
burning cases” like Texas v. Johnson. Thirty years is a good run!
One of the most noteworthy First Amendment victories during this
132
period was Buckley v. Valeo. The ACLU, represented by Joel Gora,
successfully argued that restrictions on campaign finance laws enacted in
the wake of Watergate were unconstitutional. Since its inception, the
ACLU had opposed limits on contributions to political campaigns,
arguing vigorously that more speech was better. But not everyone was
happy with Buckley, or at least with what came after it.
Neuborne identifies Buckley as something of a turning point. To
Neuborne, Buckley led the liberals and conservatives on the Court to
“forge[] a strong free speech partnership” during the “First Amendment
133
era of good feelings.” However, the decision gave the proverbial one
percent a “tangible reason to celebrate a muscular First Amendment”
134
and “corporate management a strong stake in the First Amendment.”
These tensions simmered for nearly two decades, but the internal dissent
came two years shy of the new millennium.
On June 19, 1998, a statement was released on behalf of eight
persons who have served the ACLU “in [l]eadership [p]ositions
[s]upporting the [c]onstitutionality of [e]fforts to [e]nact [r]easonable
135
[c]ampaign [f]inance [r]eform.” The signatories represented, except for
one, “every living person to have served as ACLU President, ACLU
Executive Director, ACLU Legal Director, or ACLU Legislative
Director during the past 30 years, with the exception of the current
136
leadership.” The letter, which nearly a decade later would become the
official position of the group, stated: “the First Amendment does not

129. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 113.
130. Id.
131. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
132. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
133. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 113–14.
134. Id. at 114.
135. The letter was signed by Norman Dorsen (ACLU General Counsel from 1969 to 1976); Jack
Pemberton and Aryeh Neier (Executive Directors of the ACLU from 1962 to 1978); Melvin Wulf,
Bruce Ennis, Burt Neuborne, and John Powell (National Legal Directors of the ACLU from 1962 to
1992); and Charles Morgan, Jr. and Morton Halperin (National Legislative Directors of the ACLU
from 1972 to 1976, and 1984 to 1992, respectively). Statement of Persons Who Have Served the
American Civil Liberties Union in Leadership Positions Supporting the Constitutionality of Efforts to
Enact Reasonable Campaign Finance Reform (June 19, 1998) (on file with author).
136. Id.
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forbid content-neutral efforts to place reasonable limits on campaign
137
spending.”
What is the purpose of the First Amendment? Presaging Breyer’s
138
vision, it answers “to safeguard a functioning and fair democracy.” The
letter faults Buckley, which “failed to recognize that there is a compelling
interest in defending democracy that justifies reasonable spending
139
limits.” Providing such robust protection for free speech “magnifies the
political influence of extremely wealthy individuals and distorts the
fundamental principle of political equality underlying the First
Amendment itself, causing great harm to the democratic principles that
140
underlie the Constitution.” To this view, the First Amendment’s
concerns for “political equality” and “democratic principles” outweigh
the harm laws might impose on the freedom of speech. The signatories
conclude: “Opponents of reform should no longer be permitted to hide
141
behind an unjustified constitutional smokescreen.”
On June 19, the same day, columnist E. J. Dionne, Jr. wrote in the
Washington Post that “[t]here’s been a major breakthrough in the battle
142
to reform the campaign money system.” Dionne explained that “a
group of luminaries from the [ACLU] has broken with the organization’s
opposition to the principles underlying” legislation then pending before
143
the House of Representatives. The divide officially spilled over into the
public. For the next decade, the position of Neuborne and his colleagues
would remain in the minority.
But all of that changed in 2010. On April 19, 2010, almost three
144
months to the date from the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,
the ACLU issued a press release titled “ACLU Board Addresses
145
Campaign Finance Policy.” The ACLU’s National Board of Directors,
by a “vote of 36-30, . . . revise[d] its policy on campaign finance
146
regulation [in] . . . two ways.” First, the new policy “accepts spending
147
limits as a condition of voluntary public financing plans.” Second, and
more strikingly, the new policy “permits reasonable limits on campaign
148
contributions to candidates.” This novel course was charted based on

137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. E. J. Dionne, Jr., Politics as Public Auction, Wash. Post, June 19, 1998, at A5.
143. Id.
144. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
145. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Board Addresses Campaign Finance Policy (Apr. 19, 2010) (on
file with author).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
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an acknowledgement “that very large contributions to candidates may
lead to undue influence or corruption and, at a minimum, have the
appearance of impropriety and undermine public confidence in the
149
electoral system’s integrity.”
The press release acknowledges quite candidly that “[t]his contrasts
150
with prior policy, which opposed all such limits.” The old policy stated:
“Limitations on contributions or expenditures made by individuals or
organizations for the purpose of advocating causes or candidates in the
public forum impinge directly on freedom of speech and association.
Their implementation poses serious dangers to the First Amendment.
151
They should be opposed in candidate as well as referenda elections.” In
the span of three decades, the ACLU shifted from seeing such
regulations as facially unconstitutional to being “reasonable.”
The only limiting principle offered is that the ACLU “take[s] the
position that is most consistent with protecting [civil liberties] to the
152
fullest extent possible” in light of the “implications at stake.” At stake
for what? Presumably in this situation, the implications are of protecting
speech to democracy, more broadly. Stated simply, the release explains
that the “regulation of the electoral campaign process must . . . assure
integrity and inclusivity, encourage participation and protect rights of
association while at the same time allowing for robust, full and free
discussion and debate by and about the candidates and issues of the
153
day.”
The press release offers a retrospective of how the ACLU reached
this narrow vote of 36-30. (Perhaps fittingly, a 36-30 majority is roughly
the same share as a 5-4 vote—the former eighty-three percent, the latter
eighty percent.) A committee was formed in 2007—before Citizens
154
United but after FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life —“to review the
155
ACLU’s campaign finance policy.” Preceding the April 2010 Board
meeting, the committee reported in June 2009, October 2009, and
January 2010. (Citizens United was scheduled for reargument in June
2009, reargued in September 2009, and decided in January 2010). During
that time, “committee members, as well as members of the full ACLU
National Board, engaged in extensive deliberations and study and heard

149. Id.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Mike Wendy, First Amendment Meddling Is Against the Public Interest, Progress & Freedom
Found. (May 18, 2010), http://blog.pff.org/archives/2010/05/first_amendment_meddling_is_against_the_
public_int.html.
152. Press Release, supra note 145.
153. Id.
154. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
155. Press Release, supra note 145.
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from a panel of renowned First Amendment experts representing a broad
156
array of diverse perspectives.”
The reaction to the new policy was vigorous. Two weeks later, the
Wall Street Journal (“WSJ”) published an editorial titled, The ACLU
Approves Limits on Speech: On Campaign Contributions, a Dramatic
157
About-Face. It was authored by ACLU alumni Abrams, Ira Glasser
(Executive Director of the ACLU from 1978 to 2001), and Joel Gora
(counsel to ACLU who argued Buckley). The trio offered insight into the
reversal of policy: “Over the objections of some key senior staff and by a
very narrow vote, the ACLU National Board of Directors rejected core
158
aspects of that longstanding policy earlier this month.” On the merits,
the authors note that the policy is silent about what constitutes a
“reasonable” limit. Therefore, they suggest, “the government will doubtless
159
supply the definition.” The authors conclude that “[t]he premier First
Amendment organization in America now favors limitations on the First
Amendment in the area in which all agree it must have its most powerful
160
application—political speech during election campaigns.” What is the
reason for this reversal? The “rhetoric of egalitarianism has won a
161
victory over freedom of speech.” Will it work? The authors are not so
sanguine: “The new restrictions the ACLU supports will never bring about
162
the equality it claims is its goal.”
The following week, Susan Herman, President of the ACLU Board
of Directors, wrote a letter to the editor in response to the WSJ editorial,
insisting that the ACLU “does not compromise [its] commitment” to
163
serving as a “stalwart defender of the First Amendment.” But the reply
does not challenge Abrams, Glasser, and Gora’s point. Consistent with
the press release, Herman writes that “[p]olitical speech and the First
Amendment right to engage in it freely is a cornerstone of our
164
democracy, as is the integrity of our electoral process.” Herman adds
that the decision “is an acknowledgment that very large contributions
may lead to undue influence or corruption that can undermine the
165
integrity of the electoral process.” This concedes that the ACLU now is
weighing political equality and civil liberties. With respect to “reasonable

156. Id.
157. Floyd Abrams, Ira Glasser & Joel Gora, The ACLU Approves Limits on Speech, Wall St. J. (Apr.
30, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704423504575212152820875486.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Susan N. Herman, ACLU Backs the First Amendment, Wall St. J. (May 6, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704342604575222030908027658.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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limits” on contributions to candidates, political equality trumps the civil
liberty. The speech of the “collective” prevails over the speech of the
“individual.”
Three years later, the other shoe dropped. Professors Ronald
Collins and David Skover note that “[b]etween 1976 and 2010, when it
filed a brief contesting the campaign finance laws in Citizens United v.
FEC, the national ACLU had filed fourteen briefs in the Supreme Court,
166
all of them challenging various aspects of campaign reform laws.” The
first case that broke this trend was McCutcheon. Before McCutcheon,
“the ACLU participated in almost every important Supreme Court
campaign finance case and took what some viewed as an absolutist First
Amendment position by arguing against limitations on contributions,
167
However, following Citizens United, the
expenditures, or both.”
authors explain, “the national ACLU pled the proverbial Fifth and went
silent. It expressed no position in such cases either pending in or before
168
the Supreme Court.”
The reasoning behind this new silence is complicated. Collins and
Skover explain “there was division in the ranks. Some of the new ACLU
guard broke away from the traditional party line. Some of them were no
longer the tried and true defenders of the First Amendment when it
came to campaign finance cases (and picketing near abortion clinics). Or
as they saw it, money was ruining the American electoral system so badly
that the First Amendment should not be invoked to defend its all-too169
harmful impacts on that system.” Roll Call reported that the “ACLU’s
sensitivity to opposition within its ranks may help explain why the
170
organization took no position on the McCutcheon v. FEC ruling.”
In response, Steven R. Shapiro, the legal director of the ACLU
counters that Collins and Skover “are incorrect to suggest that the
ACLU’s absence in McCutcheon v. FEC reflects a new sensitivity to
‘divisions’ within the ACLU over the campaign finance question. The
ACLU’s policy on campaign finance is among the most debated policies
171
in the organization’s history.” Shapiro explains that campaign finance
law “raises critical issues about political speech, the role of money in
172
facilitating that speech, and democratic self-governance.” However,
“despite repeated reexaminations, the ACLU” claims that it “has never

166. Ronald Collins & David Skover, When Money Speaks loc. 1380–82 (2014) (ebook).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Eliza Newlin Carney, Constitutional Amendment Debate Roils ACLU; Rules of the Game, Roll
Call (Sept. 8, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/constitutional-amendment-debateroils-aclu/.
171. Ronald Collins, The ACLU & the McCutcheon Case, SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:07
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/the-aclu-the-mccutcheon-case/.
172. Id.
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wavered from its position in favor of public financing and against
173
restrictions on political expenditures.” The 2010 change in policy,
Shapiro explains, did not concern “aggregate limits on contributions to
174
candidates and political committees,” the issue in McCutcheon. As a
result, Shapiro relayed, the ACLU “chose not to file when that issue was
175
presented in McCutcheon, and for no other reason.”
Collins and Skover were not persuaded by Shapiro’s rejoinder
concerning the “divisions” in the ACLU. First, the authors recall E.J.
Dionne’s 1998 column in The Washington Post concerning the “major
breakthrough” and “bitter debate” within the ACLU concerning
176
campaign finance laws. Second, the duo note the fact that in the last six
campaign finance cases, dueling briefs on both sides of the First
177
Amendment were filed by the ACLU and “Former ACLU officials.”
Many of these former officials signed the 1998 statement. For example,
during the October 2014 term, the ACLU and “Past Leaders of the
ACLU” (Norman Dorsen, Aryeh Neier, Burt Neuborne, and John
Shattuck) filed briefs on both sides of the “v” in Williams-Yulee v.
178
179
Florida Bar, a judicial campaign financing case.
Notwithstanding the nuanced silence in McCutcheon, this evolution
in the ACLU is still in motion. During the summer of 2014, the Senate
considered a constitutional amendment that would give Congress the
power to “regulate the raising and spending of money and in-kind
equivalents with respect to Federal elections” in order “advance the
180
fundamental principle of political equality for all.” On June 3, 2014, the
ACLU formally opposed the proposed amendment, finding that it would
“would severely limit the First Amendment, lead directly to government
censorship of political speech and result in a host of unintended
consequences that would undermine the goals the amendment has been
introduced to advance—namely encouraging vigorous political dissent
181
and providing voice to the voiceless, which we, of course, support.”

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
179. Ronald K.L. Collins, The ACLU Making (More) First Amendment News, Concurring Opinions
(Jan. 14, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/01/fan-43-first-amendment-news-the-aclumaking-more-first-amendment-news.html.
180. Letter from ACLU to the Hon. Patrick Leahy & Charles Grassley, ACLU Opposes the Udall
Amendment (June 3, 2014) (on file with author). For my take on the substance of the proposed
amendment (which never had any chance of passing, let alone ratification, but garnered forty-four
votes in the Senate), see Josh Blackman, Democrats Are Trying to Rewrite the First Amendment, Am.
Spectator (June 25, 2014), http://spectator.org/articles/59746/democrats-are-trying-rewrite-first-amendment.
181. Letter from ACLU, supra note 180.
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Three months later, on the eve of the hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, six former leaders of the ACLU—including five
members of the 1998 statement—wrote a letter supporting the proposal
to amend the Constitution. Reiterating the 1998 letter, the signatories
charged that five Justices of the Supreme Court, relying on the “ACLU’s
erroneous reading of the First Amendment as a fig leaf,” have “added
huge multi-national corporations to the list of unlimited campaign
spenders, and authorized wealthy individuals to contribute virtually
unlimited sums to party leaders in a never-ending search for wealth182
driven political influence.” The letter faulted the Supreme Court and
the National ACLU for “fail[ing] to recognize that political equality is a
compelling interest that justifies reasonable limits on massive political
183
In other words, political equality—and not just the
spending.”
elimination of corruption—is a compelling interest, so these laws survive
strict scrutiny. The letter concluded by applauding the proposed
amendment which would “overturn[] many of the Court’s narrow 5-4
campaign finance precedents and implement[] generous, content neutral
political spending limits [as] the best way to fulfill the promise of James
184
Madison’s First Amendment as democracy’s best friend.”
After a divisive hearing in the Senate in September, the divide
within the ACLU spilled further into the forefront. Neuborne, who
“spearheaded the letter in response to” ACLU’s June letter, told Roll
Call, “[t]here is a very, very significant divide within the ACLU on
185
this.” Specifically, Roll Call reported that the Court’s decision in
Citizens United has “put the ACLU’s national leaders even more out of
186
step with the organization’s rank and file.” Neuborne adds, “There is
within the organization very, very significant discontent with the existing
187
position.”
Laura Murphy, director of the ACLU’s Washington legislative
office—who signed the June letter—agreed with Neuborne, saying “I
think that there is a deep divide within the ACLU about this issue,” but
stressed that “we are taking positions that are supported by our national
182. Letter from Norman Dorsen et al., to Senator Patrick Leahy et al., Former Leaders of the
ACLU (Sept. 4, 2014) (on file with author).
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id. (emphasis added). This language about Madison is almost certainly based on Neuborne’s
new book, Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 20 (“It’s
possible, of course, that Revolutionary-era monkeys on a typewriter (or mice with quill pens) would
have randomly stumbled upon such a fine-tuned democratic chronology. But even if the disciplined
order of the six textual ideas is merely the result of random good fortune, the full First Amendment, as
Madison and his friends wrote it, should be democracy’s best friend. It’s tragic that the current Supreme
Court majority, utterly ignoring Madison’s music, has turned the isolated, artificially truncated sevenword Free Speech Clause into democracy’s bad parent.”) (emphasis added).
185. Carney, supra note 170.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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188

board.”
Murphy added that the “letter is meant to confuse
congressional staff about who speaks for the ACLU,” and she has no
189
respect “for this eleventh hour ‘sham issue advocacy.’” At an event at
the Cato Institute, Nadine Strossen echoed these sentiments: “Those of
us who are First Amendment absolutists have been losing some ground,
although I am happy to say that in contrast to former ACLU leaders, the
current ACLU is very strongly opposing, and effectively opposing, the
190
proposed constitutional amendment on this ground.” The emphasis on
“current” is my own. It is unclear how long this line will hold, given the
already fractured ACLU.
Recently, a kerfuffle emerged over the ACLU’s 2015 “Workplan.”
As Professor Ron Collins noted, excluded from the eleven priorities the
organization listed—including “reproductive rights,” “freedom to marry,”
191
Professor
and “mass incarceration”—was the freedom of speech.
Howard Wasserman offered a guess of “one possible (if not entirely
accurate) answer: We won. There are no ‘major civil liberties battles’ to
192
be fought or won with respect to the freedom of speech.” Anthony
Romero, the Executive Director of the ACLU replied that “The ACLU
is and has always been fully committed to protecting free speech, even
193
when that speech may be offensive or controversial to many.”
However, perhaps giving credence to Wasserman’s theory, Romero
notes that “[the ACLU’s] First Amendment freedom of expression work
is somewhat unique in that a large share of it involves responding to
threats or incidents that occur on the local level and not generally as part
194
of a broader, coordinated threat to freedom of expression.”
The ACLU does not operate in a vacuum. The position the
organization adopts represents broader trends regarding speech and civil
liberties.

188. Id.
189. Ronald K.L. Collins, Six Former ACLU Leaders Contest Group’s 1st Amendment Position on
Campaign Finance—ACLU’s Legislative Director Responds, Concurring Opinions (Sept. 6, 2014),
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/09/fan-30-1-first-amendment-news-six-former-aclu-leaderscontest-groups-1st-amendment-position-on-campaign-finance-aclus-legislative-director-responds.html.
190. Ronald K.L. Collins, Cato Hosts Panel on First Amendment: Strossen Discusses McCutcheon and
History of ACLU Stance, Concurring Opinions (Sept. 17, 2014), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/
2014/09/fan-32-1-first-amendment-news-cato-hosts-panel-on-first-amendment-strossen-discusses-mccutcheon
-history-of-aclu-stance.html.
191. Ronald K.L. Collins, ACLU “2015 Workplan” Sets out Narrow Range of First Amendment
Activities, Concurring Opinions (Feb. 25, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/02/fan49-first-amendment-news-aclu-2015-workplan-sets-out-narrow-range-of-first-amendment-activities.html.
192. Howard Wasserman, Declaring Victory?, PrawfsBlawg (Feb. 26, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/02/declaring-victory.html.
193. Ronald K.L. Collins, ACLU’s 2015 Workplan and the First Amendment—Anthony Romero
Responds, Concurring Opinions (Mar. 4, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/03/fan50-first-amendment-news-aclus-2015-workplan-the-first-amendment-anthony-romero-responds.html.
194. Id.
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2. The Collective Justices
The simmering intellectual revolt within the ACLU served as a
harbinger of the shift on the high court. So goes the ACLU, so goes the
Supreme Court. In 2010, Justice Stevens—as the senior member in
dissent—assigned himself the Citizens United dissent. The opinion, which
would have upheld the campaign finance regulation, attempted to adhere
to longstanding First Amendment precedents. Indeed, Stevens faulted
the majority for overruling the Court’s 1990 decision in Austin v.
195
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.
But McCutcheon was different. The liberal bloc could have written a
straightforward but powerful dissent, arguing that the aggregate limits
served the purpose of reducing corruption in politics. There was no need
to reimagine the First Amendment. But reimagine, it did. The effort to
ground the First Amendment in distortions from Holmes, Brandeis, and
Madison was entirely superfluous unless it was designed to build the
basis for further rulings to promote “collective speech.” The dissent
reads like the foundation—albeit a cracked one—for a new vision of the
First Amendment.
While Breyer has been quite open about his views of a narrow First
Amendment freedom—dissenting alone in Brown v. Entertainment
196
197
and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. —what makes
Merchants Ass’n
McCutcheon so significant is that he is joined by his progressive
compatriots. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan all endorsed his
vision of collective speech. With Justice Stevens gone, Justice
Ginsburg—who now had the highest seniority—assigned the dissent to
Breyer, knowing how he would approach the issue. Floyd Abrams
explains that the “most surprising and disturbing” element of
McCutcheon was the dissent, “for the first time, Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan join [] Justice Stephen
Breyer’s minimization of long-recognized and well-established First
Amendment interests by maintaining that, after all, the side seeking to
overcome those interests had at least as strong a First Amendment
198
argument on its side.” In light of Breyer’s dissent, this assignment—
with no noted dissension—augurs a broader jurisprudential shift on the
left.
Perhaps this line of thinking will be confined to the doctrine of
campaign finance law. Justice Kagan had previously commented that her
199
decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n to invalidate a

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990).
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Abrams, supra note 15.
131 S. Ct. 2729.
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statute regulating the sale of violent video games to minors “was the case
where I struggled most and thought most often I’m on the wrong side of
200
201
it.” She added, “I sweated over that mightily.” She explained at an
event at the Aspen Institute that she ultimately joined the majority
because she “couldn’t figure out how to square that with our First
202
Amendment precedents and precedent is very important to me.” To
Kagan at least then, precedent matters. On the other hand, Breyer
discounted these precedents, and dissented in Brown, finding that the
state has a paramount interest in limiting speech to protect children from
203
psychological harms from violent video games. But these precedents
are not set in stone, and in many respects, are severely undercut by the
new line of thinking established by the McCutcheon dissent.
Perhaps a recent case suggests the further development of this
204
doctrine. In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision upholding the
state’s power to prohibit specialized license plates bearing the
Confederate battle flag. In keeping with his views toward collective
speech, Breyer construed the license plate as a form of “government
speech,” rather than the speech of the individual group that designed the
plate. He explained, “When government speaks, it is not barred by the
Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. That
freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process
205
that first and foremost provides a check on government speech.” Here
too, Breyer views the political process as the check on speech, rather
than the other way around. Indeed, in this case, the state openly
censored license plates designed by Texans that it deemed offensive—
206
what the dissent labeled as “blatant viewpoint discrimination.” As
Justice Alito framed it in his dissent, “[t]he Court’s decision passes off
private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a
precedent that threatens private speech that government finds
207
208
displeasing.” This, Alito charges, is “dangerous reasoning.” After
spending seventeen pages on the government’s perspective, Breyer closes
with but a mere paragraph on the “free speech rights of private persons,”
that clumsily equates the state being unable to compel private speech

200. Josh Blackman, Kagan on Her First Term, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Aug. 3, 2011),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2011/08/03/kagan-on-her-first-term/.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
205. Id. at 2245 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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with an individual being unable to compel government speech. This
decision evinces strong shades of the collective liberty that pervades
McCutcheon.
Floyd Abrams referred to the dissent in McCutcheon as a
210
“disturbing and recurring reality,” and “deeply disquieting.” Abrams
notes that significant unanimous decisions of the Court, “would be at risk
if the First Amendment were somehow viewed as anything but a
limitation on the government’s power to limit speech, even in the
supposed service of ‘preserving democratic order,’ vindicating ‘collective
211
212
speech,’ or the like.” First, consider Mills v. Alabama. Alabama
enacted a law that ostensibly prohibited a newspaper from publishing an
editorial on election day “in support of or in opposition to any
213
proposition that is being voted on.” The law was passed ostensibly with
214
a “pro-democratic intent.” The Alabama Supreme Court found that
the law “protects the public from confusive [sic] last-minute charges and
countercharges and the distribution of propaganda in an effort to
215
influence voters on an election day.”
Sounds like the rationale against releasing The Hillary Movie before
the election in 2008, doesn’t it? These were the facts in Citizens United.
In that case, the district court observed the FEC could prohibit the
release of the movie because it was “susceptible of no other
interpretation than to inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit
for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in a
President Hillary Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against
216
her.” Similarly, recall that when Citizens United was first argued,
Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart told Justice Alito that the
government could ban a book that criticized a candidate, if it was paid
217
for by corporate contributions. When then-Solicitor General Kagan

209. Id. at 2252.
210. Abrams, supra note 15.
211. Id.
212. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
213. Id. at 216.
214. Abrams, supra note 15.
215. Mills, 284 U.S. at 219 (quoting Alabama v. Mills, 176 So. 2d 884, 890 (Ala. 1965)).
216. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279 (D.D.C. 2008). In an irony
too rich for reality, Democratic Presidential nominee Hillary Clinton—who has tacitly endorsed at
least two super PACs supporting her—told her top fundraisers of her litmus test so that any Justice
she appoints would vote to overturn Citizens United. Matea Gold & Anne Gearan, Hillary Clinton’s
Litmus Test for Supreme Court Nominees: A Pledge to Overturn Citizens United, Wash. Post (May 14,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/14/hillary-clintons-litmus-testfor-supreme-court-nominees-a-pledge-to-overturn-citizens-united/.
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–28, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205).
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reargued the case, she wisely backed off an answer that Justice Alito
218
called a “stunner,” but was compelled by the government’s position.
In Mills, the Warren Court unanimously rejected the rationale that
too much speech might be a bad thing. The Court found that “no test of
reasonableness”—even one that protects the collective speech rights of
the populace—“can save a state law from invalidation as a violation of
the First Amendment when that law makes it a crime for a newspaper
editor to do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a
219
publicly held election.” Abrams commented “Mills held the statute
unconstitutional, regardless of its supposedly pro-democratic intent of
220
protecting a potentially confused and misled public.” Applying the
“collective liberty” approach reflected in the Citizens United dissent
would have required upholding the Alabama law.
221
“What about Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo?” Abrams
asks. In this case, the Court invalidated a Florida law that required a
222
right-of-reply for any candidate who was criticized in a newspaper.
What could be “more democratic, more consistent with public
participation in the creation of public policy,” Abrams asks, “than a
right-of-reply statute which assures that if a candidate was attacked on
the basis of his personal character or official record by a newspaper, that
223
he should have the chance to respond?” Especially where—in a line
right out of the Citizens United dissent—“the power to inform the
American people and shape public opinion” has been “place[d] in a few
224
hands” of wealthy media conglomerates. Would this law not improve
the strength of the “chain” between the populace and elected
representatives?
Characterizing the supporters of the Florida law, Chief Justice
Burger observed that “[t]he First Amendment interest of the public in
being informed is said to be in peril because the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is
225
today a monopoly controlled by the owners of the market.” Sound
familiar? This argument could have also come straight from the Citizens
United dissent. The Court acknowledges that a “responsible press is an
undoubtedly desirable goal”—paying homage to Justice Breyer’s desire
for democracy—but still unanimously struck down the law because
“press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many

218. Josh Blackman, Recap of Federalist Society 30th Anniversary Gala Dinner with Remarks by
Justice Alito #FedSoc2012, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Nov. 16, 2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/
11/16/recap-of-federalist-society-30th-anniversary-gala-dinner-with-remarks-by-justice-alito-fedsoc2012/.
219. Mills, 284 U.S. at 220.
220. Abrams, supra note 15.
221. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
222. Id.
223. Abrams, supra note 15.
224. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250.
225. Id.
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226

other virtues it cannot be legislated.” Neither of these precedents
would be safe if the “collective liberty” mentality is taken to its logical
conclusions.
This new progressive bloc potentially reflects a huge shift on the
Court with respect to civil liberties. Neuborne characterizes the
dissenting quartet as “tend[ing] to approach the First Amendment as an
aspirational partnership between speakers and hearers aimed at
preserving human dignity and improving the efficient functioning of
227
institutions dependent on informed free choice.” Neuborne sees
himself as continuing the new experiment from Justice Breyer, who has
“begun to root his aspirational reading of the Constitution in respect for
228
democratic governance.” Rather than speaking in terms of “collective
speech,” Neuborne posits that our individualistic “[c]urrent First
Amendment doctrine . . . aggrandizes the speaker (including conduits
dressed up as speakers), subordinates the hearer, ignores the speech
229
target, and demonizes the government regulator.” But the costs of this
doctrine have begun to chip away at the shiny veneer of “speech is speech,”
Neuborne explains. “A steady diet of speaker-obsessed deregulatory freespeech doctrine has begun to expose its costs to Madisonian democracy
and to the larger social partnership between speakers and hearers that
230
supports it.” What is the response to this demolition of democracy?
“The time may be ripe for a modest political shake-up in Mr. Madison’s
231
First Amendment neighborhood.” In other words, collective speech.
During a discussion about Neuborne’s book at NYU Law School,
Justice Sotomayor asked, “You say that the focus of the First Amendment
is democracy. You invite your thesis as a different way of interpreting the
232
Constitution. So who decides what promotes democracy?” Neuborne
replied jokingly, “I’m sort of shocked that you asked that, because it’s
233
clear that I define it.” The Justice comically shot back, “No, no, no, you
234
forget, I do.” Though she was no doubt kidding, based on the tenor of
the event, there is a startling kernel of truth to her comment. The logical
implication of Justice Breyer’s theory is that the Court must place itself
in the position to decide which speech promotes democracy and relegate
all other types of speech to the constitutional ash heap. But to that,
Neuborne answered, “I would rather have judges asking” what results in

226. Id.
227. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 109.
228. Id. at 11.
229. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 116.
231. Id.
232. Justice Sonia Sotomayor Joins Burt Neuborne and Trevor Morrison to Discuss Madison’s Music,
NYU L. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/sonia-sotomayor-burt-neuborne-madisons-music.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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“a good democracy or a bad democracy” than “pretending to decide the
case by deciding what seven words” of the First Amendment means
235
“without even thinking about the consequences for democracy.” So
here is the divide. Rather than understanding what the Constitution
actually means, the collectivists will instead disregard speech inconsistent
with their personal views of democracy.
While the Justices are not quite there yet, Neuborne is onto
236
something. In my 2010 editorial, co-authored with David E. Bernstein,
we worried that “Breyer’s apparent ascendance as doyen of the Court’s
liberal wing threatens to roll back decades of pro-liberty precedents, and
to destroy the consensus on the Court that freedom of speech and other
essential rights must not be sacrificed to the shifting whims of legislative
237
majorities.” We might be inching closer to that radical revolution in
constitutional law. And unlike in the past, where stalwarts such as the
ACLU could be counted on to defend this most fundamental civil liberty,
the evolution on the Court has mirrored the evolution of the Bar.
II. Collective Exercise
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and its statutory
cousin, RFRA have followed a similar trajectory as free speech, between
the collective and the individual conceptions of liberty. During the
heyday of the Warren Court, the Justices embraced the Free Exercise
Clause as a wedge to carve out exemptions from generally applicable
laws that imposed a “substantial burden” on faith. However, decades
later this individual right gave way to the collectivist mentality ushered in
238
by Justice Scalia’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. It was for
the democratic process, and not the courts, to provide extra protections
for faith. However, Congress responded by tugging the religiosity of the
nation back toward the individual through the then popular RFRA.
After a brief period of prosperity, RFRA was dragged back into
controversy, this time by the conservatives, who recognized an exemption
for Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. from the ACA’s contraceptive mandate.
Now, it is the progressives who lash out against the individualistic free
exercise right, and instead sought to let the democratic process decide
which carve outs were suitable. The pendulum continues to swing.

235. Id.
236. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 109.
237. David E. Bernstein & Josh Blackman, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Shows Progressive
Streak, NJ.com (July 12, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2011/07/supreme_court_
justice_stephen.html.
238. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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A. SHERBERT Individualizes Free Exercise
239

In the 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner, the Warren Court set
the stage for the development of an individualist notion of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The case involved a classic
clash between majority and minority faiths. Adell Sherbert, a member of
240
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, observed the Sabbath on Saturday.
South Carolina determined that the only day of rest that could excuse
someone from working would be Sunday, the traditional Sabbath for
almost all Christian religions. Which interest would trump: the individual’s
faith or society’s recognition of which exercises of faith ought to be
protected? Stated differently, would the state’s determination that
Sunday was the proper day of rest outweigh an individual’s determination
that Saturday was the proper day of rest? The Court, by a vote of 7-2,
chose the former.
To resolve this quandary, the Court puts forth this test: for the denial
of benefits to be valid, “it must be either because her disqualification as a
beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional
rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free
exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional
241
power to regulate.’” As Justice Brennan framed the issue for the
majority, the lower court’s “ruling forces [Sherbert] to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
242
accept work, on the other hand.” Further, compounding this injury is
that the law “saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind
of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian’s religious
243
liberty.” The policy, though one of general applicability, violated the
Free Exercise Clause.
The dissent by Justices Harlan and White (the latter joined the
majority opinion in Smith twenty-seven years later), explained that the
“South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly applied this law in
conformity with its clearly expressed purpose”: excluding benefits if
“unemployment has resulted not from the inability of industry to provide
244
a job but rather from personal circumstances, no matter how compelling.”
Rather than being based on any religions notions, the conclusion was
mandated because “virtually all of the mills in the Spartanburg area were
operating on a six-day week,” and she was not “discriminated against . . .
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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245

on the basis of her religious beliefs.” What the Court’s holding does,
the dissenters explain, is require the Constitution to be read to “compel
[the] to carve out [of] an exception—and to provide benefits—for those
246
whose unavailability is due to their religious convictions.” The rule of
Shebert would prevail for nearly three decades.
B. SMITH Collectivizes Free Exercise
The criticisms of Sherbert became pronounced throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. The conservative wing of the Court, led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist “had been championing a retreat from the ‘liberal’ Free
247
Exercise Clause view for years.” This shift culminated in the 1990
248
Alfred Smith was
decision of Employment Division v. Smith.
terminated by his employer for his ingestion of peyote—a powerful
hallucinogen—taken in the course of his Native American religious
249
ceremonies. Smith challenged the subsequent denial of unemployment
benefits based on the drug use as a violation of the First Amendment’s
250
Free Exercise Clause. In a controversial decision by Justice Scalia, the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause could not be used as a
251
defense against a law of general applicability. The Court rejected the
Sherbert framework, finding that “many laws will not meet the test” and
that it “required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
252
every conceivable kind.” Further, the Court added, “danger increases
253
in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs.” These
exemptions include “laws providing for equal opportunity for the
254
races.” The First Amendment, Scalia explained, does not require this
255
result. Justice Scalia determined that the Constitution did not allow
courts to be in the business of exempting people from the laws based on
their religious beliefs.

245. Id. at 41920 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
247. Eugene Volokh, Many Liberals’ (Sensible) Retreat from the Old Justice Brennan/ACLU Position
on Religious Exemptions, Wash. Post (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/04/01/many-liberals-sensible-retreat-from-the-old-justice-brennanaclu-position-onreligious-exemptions/.
248. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
249. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 888.
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 889.
255. Id.
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How should the diverse “religious preference[s]” of our “cosmopolitan
256
nation” be protected? The answer—as Justice Breyer would explain in a
different context—is democracy. “Values that are protected against
government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are
257
not thereby banished from the political process,” writes Scalia.
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as
258
well.

In other words, the political process can protect minority religious beliefs,
in much the same way that this process protects minority free speech.
Three decades after Sherbert, Justice Brennan found his opinion
discarded by Smith, and joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent for four
justices. The dissent would have retained Sherbert, for free exercise is not
a collective right subject to the democratic process, but rather an
259
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen
“individual religious liberty.”
laments that the majority, all “judicial conservatives,” engaged in an
“utterly unforced error,” as the Justices who would otherwise “support a
broad construction of First Amendment freedoms” failed to “embrace[]
260
the overriding value of religious liberty.” The job of “defend[ing the]
Free Exercise [C]lause as a substantive freedom fell to the three
261
dissenting liberals.”
With this decision, free exercise immediately became more of a
collective right, protected so long as the legislature deemed that it served
some higher purpose—and generally the principle motivating these laws
was equality and no exceptions. In the final paragraph of the Court’s
opinion, Justice Scalia concedes this weakness of his conclusion: “It may
fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
262
widely engaged in.” In other words, like with speech, the political
process will not protect minority beliefs.
South Carolinians who observe the Sabbath on Sunday would have
no problem seeking exemptions from the legislature, but Seventh-Day
256. Id. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)); see also Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1849 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American community is today,
as it long has been, a rich mosaic of religious faiths.”).
257. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
260. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Justice Scalia’s Worst Opinion, Pub. Discourse (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14844/.
261. Id.
262. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (emphasis added); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Adventists would be out of luck. Christians would have no problem
seeking an exemption from prohibition to use sacramental wine, but
Alfred Smith could not realistically seek a peyote exemption. Nonetheless,
Scalia writes, the “unavoidable consequence of democratic government
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
263
the centrality of all religious beliefs.” Justice Scalia wanted the Court to
get out of the business of carving out exemptions for every religion
imaginable, even noting that certain minority faiths might be burdened
substantially. This is collective exercise—religious exercise is protected
by the Constitution only so long as it promotes a greater societal good.
The parallel between Smith and Justice Breyer’s McCutcheon dissent is
striking. We will return to this juxtaposition later.
C. Restoring the Individual Free Exercise Clause
The reaction to the “collective” notion of free exercise articulated in
Smith resulted in a massive political backlash. How could a person be
punished for exercising sincerely held religious beliefs when an
accommodation was so easy? How could it be that people of faith could
only turn to the legislature to seek exemptions from generally applicable
laws? How could religious minorities, who lack the clout of the
mainstream faiths, possibly seek such largesse from state governments?
These questions, occasioned by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, led to
the federal RFRA.
In 1993, then-Representative Charles Schumer of New York
264
introduced RFRA in the House of Representatives. Its counterpart bill
in the Senate was co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy. RFRA was
supported by the “ACLU joined with a broad coalition of religious and
civil liberties groups, including People for the American Way [and] the
265
National Association of Evangelicals.” The bill enjoyed such wideranging bipartisan support that it passed the House on a voice vote,
passed the Senate by a vote of ninety-seven to three, and was promptly
signed into law by President Clinton. Imagine such a significant law
passing today with this kind of vote!
The law states that the federal “Government shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless it “is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of
266
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” At a minimum,
263. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
264. Chuck Schumer on RFRA (C-SPAN television broadcast May 11, 1993).
265. The ACLU and Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/
aclu-and-freedom-religion-and-belief (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
266. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4).
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RFRA attempted to reverse the Court’s collective construction of the
Free Exercise Clause in Smith and restore Justice Brennan’s
individualistic notion of free exercise. Whether it did more is an open
question.
The first decade of RFRA was not controversial. Consider Gonzales
267
v. O Centro Espirita. This case involved a “small American branch” of
a “religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest [that] receives
communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed from plants unique to
the region, that contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled
268
Substances Act [(“CSA”)] by the Federal Government.” In facts
analogous to Smith, the Court applied RFRA rather than the Free
Exercise Clause to unanimously rule against the government. The group
was entitled to a religious accommodation from the CSA because of
RFRA. Once again, free exercise was treated as an individual right.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court recognized the difficulty
of applying the “compelling interest test.” The Court conceded,
[The] task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is [not] an
easy one. Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the
Government here were cited by this Court in deciding that the
approach later mandated by Congress under RFRA was not required
269
as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause.

But because this was a statute that can be modified easily if it does not
work well—unlike the First Amendment—the Court was comfortable in
complying with Congress’s mandate “that courts should strike sensible
balances, pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the
270
Government to address the particular practice at issue.” Viewed as a
way to resurrect Brennan’s protection of individual exercise, or as means
to prevent the government from infringing on the rights of religious
minorities, RFRA was designed to restore Sherbert and repudiate Smith.
Or at least that was the plan.
D. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES
But then a funny thing happened on the way to health care utopia.
Regulations implementing the ACA imposed a mandate on all large
employers—both for-profit and nonprofit—to provide insurance that
covers emergency contraceptives, commonly known as abortifacients.

267. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
268. Id. at 423.
269. Id. at 439 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 88590
(1990)).
270. Id. To this point, Justice Scalia recently noted that he “would not have enacted” RLUIPA,
Congress’s spending-power workaround to the partially-invalidated RFRA. Josh Blackman, Justice
Scalia Would Not Have Enacted RLUIPA? What About RFRA?, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/10/08/justice-scalia-would-not-have-enacted-rluipa-what-about-rfra/.
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RFRA, which was designed to protect religious minorities, was hoisted as
a tool for corporations to exempt themselves from a law of general
applicability, citing a substantial burden on their religious exercise. In
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court recognized that closely held for-profit
corporations were protected by RFRA, and that requiring these
corporations to pay for insurance plans that include certain emergency
271
contraceptives violated their religious exercise.
Before delving into the RFRA analysis, it is worth pausing to
inquire how the contraceptive mandate came to be. Contrary to how it
has been portrayed in the media, the ACA has no actual contraceptive
272
mandate. Section 300gg-13 of the ACA provides that employersponsored health insurance “shall, at a minimum provide coverage for
and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for . . . with respect to
women, such additional preventative care and screenings not described in
paragraph [one] as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported
273
by the Health Resources and Services Administration [(“HRSA”)].”
The “preventative care and screening” products “with respect to
women” were deliberately not defined.
HRSA “in turn consulted the Institute of Medicine, a nonprofit
group of volunteer advisers, in determining which preventive services to
274
require.” On February 15, 2012—nearly two years after the ACA was
signed into law—HRSA issued a proposed regulation that “nonexempt
employers are generally required to provide ‘coverage, without cost
sharing’ for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(“FDA”)] approved
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education
275
and counseling.’” That included drugs viewed as abortifacients. The
contents of the contraceptive mandate came from the Institute of
Medicine, not Congress. The leadership in Congress no doubt knew this
would happen, as reflected in the legislative history cited in Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent, but they did not have the votes to do so themselves.
Why is this history relevant? Because had majoritarian politics been
involved in 2010, the ACA would have never included such a mandate.
271. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439.
272. See Josh Blackman, Unraveled: Obamacare, Religious Liberty & Executive Power chs. 3–4
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript available at bit.ly/1JxTdYn). For purposes of full disclosure, I’d like to
note here that I authored an amicus brief on behalf of the Cato Institute in support of the Little Sisters
of the Poor’s petition for certiorari. See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 7–9, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir.
2015) (No. 15-105) (discussing the history of the contraceptive mandate). I also filed a merits-stage
brief in the granted case, also on behalf of the Cato Institute. See Brief for the Cato Institute and
Independent Women’s Forum as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7–10, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos.
14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191 (U.S. 2015).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010) (emphasis added).
274. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) (citing 77 Fed. Reg.
872526 (Feb. 15, 2012)).
275. Id.
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The specific birth control products were deliberately not named. In order
to avoid even more controversy with Pro-Life Democrats, led by Bart
276
Stupak —who only signed onto the ACA based on a feckless executive
277
order from the President —Congress kicked the can and delegated the
all important task of deciding which contraceptives must be provided by
employer-sponsored plans to the HRSA. Had these details been in the
bill, it likely would have never passed. Indeed during oral arguments,
Justice Kennedy questioned how an administrative agency could
determine what a compelling interest is and which religious groups
should be exempted. He stated (for Justice Kennedy seldom asks actual
questions), “But when we have a First Amendment issue of this
consequence, shouldn’t we indicate that it’s for the Congress, not the
agency, to determine that this corporation gets the exemption on that
278
one, and not even for RFRA purposes, for other purposes.”
But the faceless bureaucracy that imposed the contraceptive
279
mandate—with little attention for religious conviction —may well be a
harbinger of future decisions by a more secular state. When individual
exercise begins to exert negative externalities on nonbelievers, a
collective free exercise right becomes much more attractive. And so the
pendulum has swung back.
III. From Individual Liberty to Collective Liberty
How do we make sense of the shifting of positions of individuals and
organizations of conservative and liberal persuasions on speech and
exercise? The calculus reduces down to three questions: Who is
benefiting? Who is harmed? What is the purpose of the right? For the
first question, consider whether the beneficiary is someone like Mary
Beth Tinker, who wore a black armband at school to protest the war, or
like Shaun McCutcheon, who sought to donate millions of dollars to
dozens of candidates nationwide. For the second question, consider the
relatively trivial costs associated with providing unemployment benefits
276. Brief of Democrats for Life of America & Bart Stupak as Amici Curiae Supporting Hobby
Lobby et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos.13-354 & 13-356).
277. Josh Blackman, Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare 75 (2013)
(“Hours after Stupak reached this compromise, Tribe emailed Kagan, expressing incredulity that the
ACA was about to be passed ‘with the Stupak group accepting the magic of what amounts to a signing
statement on steroids!’ Tribe stated the obvious, and what any first-year constitutional law student
would know—that Schmidt was right. The president’s signing statement with respect to abortion was
legally impotent.”).
278. Adam J. White, Kennedy’s Question: How Will the Court Decide Hobby Lobby?, Wkly.
Standard (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/kennedy-s-question_787038.html;
see also Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, What Next Year’s Attack on Obamacare Will Look Like, Daily
Beast (Sept. 29, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/29/what-next-year-sattack-on-obamacare-will-look-like.html.
279. See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Little Sisters of
the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell (No. 15-105).
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to Alfred Smith, the Native American who ingested peyote, compared to
the significant costs of denying contraceptive coverage for female
employees of Hobby Lobby. For the third question, consider whether the
purpose of rights is to promote the unburdened liberty of Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. to exercise its religious beliefs, or to ensure the equality of its
female employees to have coverage for contraceptives. The answers to
these questions speak volumes of how the Justices, from both flanks, as
well as liberal and conservative groups in the public, have perceived
rights as individual or collective liberties.
A. The Beneficiary of Individual Liberty
In different generations, free speech benefited different groups. During
the Warren and Burger Courts, many First Amendment cases involved a
puritanical state attempting to suppress some sort of antiestablishment
message. Consider the parties asserting the First Amendment: Mary Beth
Tinker, who sought to wear a black armband at school to protest the
280
Vietnam War; Paul Robert Cohen who wore a jacket emblazoned with
281
“Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse; David Paul O’Brien who burned his
282
draft card. First Amendment cases not concerning the war dealt with
civil rights: The New York Times published a potentially libelous attack
283
on the Police Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama; the NAACP
284
refused to publish their membership list. For speech, these judgments
concerned war protesters and civil rights advocates. In all instances, the
proverbial establishment was attempting to suppress speech that conflicted
with the state’s goals. In response, the activists were sticking it to the man.
A similar dynamic prevailed for Free Exercise cases. All of the
parties before the Court were members of minority faiths, that the state
was not interested in creating exemptions for: Sherbert, the Seventh-Day
285
Adventist who declined to work on Saturday; the Amish Jonas Yoder
286
who refused to send his teenage children to compulsory public schools;
Roy Torcaso the atheist who was denied a commission as a Maryland
287
notary public because he would not declare his belief in God; (from a
different era) Alfred Smith who was denied unemployment benefits
288
because he ingested peyote in a Native American ceremony.

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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It was against this backdrop that many scholars viewed RFRA—the
Free Exercise Clause’s statutory cousin—as designed to protect
“minority” religions, not the “majority” Christian faiths. Professor Howard
Friedman wrote on his influential blog, Religion Clause, “Traditionally it
was assumed that the federal RFRA would be used by minority religions
to fend off broad regulations that might be enacted without a careful
weighing of idiosyncratic religious practices that are important to often
discrete and insular groups with comparatively small numbers of
289
adherents.” Professor Eric Segall adds that “RFRA was enacted in
response to a kind of inequality among religions . . . [and practices that]
290
had a discriminatory impact on religious minorities.”
How so?
Traditionally, any law that intruded on religion would have legislative
carve outs to suit the needs of majority religions. For example, laws
prohibiting alcohol would invariably have carve outs for sacramental
wine because Christians would lobby the legislative process. However
Native Americans who ingest peyote would be out of luck when the
291
legislature is considering drug laws.
For exercise, these rulings
protected religious minorities from the puritanical views of the mainstream
faiths.
Today, we have very different plaintiffs. Gone are Mary Beth
Tinker and Alfred Smith. Instead, we have Citizens United that uses
corporate contributions to produce a film critical of Hillary Clinton;
Shaun McCutcheon who refuses to abide by an aggregate cap of
$123,200; and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that refuses to provide insurance
covering abortifacients for its employees. Adam Liptak cogently
summarized the shift in The New York Times: “Liberals used to love the
First Amendment. But that was in an era when courts used it mostly to
292
protect powerless people like civil rights activists and war protesters.”
The juxtaposition between the protestor wearing the “Fuck the Draft”
jacket in Cohen v. California and the partisan Citizens United
corporation could not be starker.

289. Howard Friedman, Why Is Indiana’s RFRA so Controversial? This Blogger’s Analysis,
Religion Clause (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:05 PM), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2015/03/why-is-indianasrfra-so-controversial.html (emphasis added); cf. Josh Blackman, Is Indiana Protecting Discrimination?,
Nat’l Rev. (Mar. 30, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416160/indiana-protectingdiscrimination-josh-blackman (discussing how the recent backlash against Indiana’s RFRA overlooks
the context from which other state RFRAs evolved).
290. Eric Segall, Religious Exemptions, Religious Equality, and Religious Preferences, Dorf on L.
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/04/religious-exemptions-religious-equality.html.
291. Compare American Indian Religious Freedom Act and its post-Smith 1994 amendments
protecting the use of peyote as a sacrament in traditional religious ceremonies. See American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
292. Adam Liptak, First Amendment, ‘Patron Saint’ of Protestors, Is Embraced by Corporations,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2015, at A14.
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Lincoln Caplan observed that the First Amendment’s “most fervent
champions are not standing up for mistrusted outsiders . . . or for the
dispossessed and powerless. Today’s advocates do the bidding of
insiders—the super-rich and the ultra-powerful, the airline, drug,
petroleum and tobacco industries, all the winners in America’s winner293
take-all society.” Empirically, the liberals might be right. As Professor
294
John C. Coates, IV told Liptak, based on a new study he conducted,
“‘Corporations have begun to displace individuals as the direct
beneficiaries of the First Amendment [and the trend is] recent but
295
accelerating.’”
Floyd Abrams concedes the point: “There is truth in the proposition
that a number of recent First Amendment victories in recent years have
been on behalf of the ‘haves’—some of them corporations, some
individuals. But that is no basis for concluding that the decisions were
296
wrongly analyzed or wrongly decided.” In other words, who cares who
is benefitting from free speech? Picking and choosing the correct and
incorrect beneficiaries of the First Amendment is a task ill-suited for
courts and one that undermines the free flow of ideas from all groups
that wish to speak. Abrams adds,
My First Amendment leads me to favor more speech, not less, on
campus. And more speech, not less, in our elections. And more speech,
not less, by corporations. And unions. And individuals. To me, then,
the issue is not who benefits from reading the 297First Amendment
broadly. It is that we all lose by reading it narrowly.

Nadine Strossen, former president of the ACLU, dismisses the
concerns of the “many pundits who have been saying, ‘Oh, this is going
to benefit Republicans, or benefit conservatives, or benefit big business.’
298
Not at all!” Rather, Citizens United “unshackle[d] all corporations,
including nonprofit corporations, such as the ACLU, which itself was
299
mentioned. Strossen stressed that the “[t]he benefits of added free
speech, and added voices, and added opinions will go across the political
300
spectrum.” Strossen explained at the Cato Institute’s Constitution Day
panel on the First Amendment that “[m]any of us believe that [what]
democracy is all about is that you vote for a candidate [and] you give

293. Collins, supra note 105.
294. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 Const. Comment. 223, 224 (2015) (finding “[n]early half of First Amendment
challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of
organizations or individuals”).
295. Liptak, supra note 292.
296. Collins, supra note 105.
297. Id.
298. Collins & Skover, supra note 166.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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money to a candidate because you want that person to share and be
responsive to your concerns. That’s is [sic] not corruption; that is
301
democracy.” Strossen also recognized the cost of her First Amendment
support, stating that her “defense of letting money speak has, in most of
[her] circles, caused [her] to be called a ‘puppet of plutocracy’ and not a
302
champion of liberty.”
Should it matter that the First Amendment is now being used to
shield the proverbial one percent at the cost to the ninety-nine percent?
This framing of the question presumes that speech is only protected so
long as it protects the correct audience. This conclusion underscores the
significance of the McCutcheon dissent’s adoption of a utilitarian vision
of speech, which is protected, so long as it contributes to “democracy.”
With this framework, the interests of Citizens United or Shaun
McCutcheon are not viewed on the same level as Mary Beth Tinker or
Paul Robert Cohen. Similarly, the visceral reaction to affording RFRA
protections to Hobby Lobby, a profitable corporation, was premised on a
tacit acceptance that the beneficiary belonged to the powerful and
majority faith in society. To this view, free exercise exists to protect minority
religious groups could not seek redress through the legislative process.
The shift in who has benefited from recent First Amendment
decisions helps to explain the shift on the right and left toward individual
and collective liberty. But, more pronounced than the identity of the
beneficiary is who absorbs the negative externalities of individual liberty.
B. The Internalizers of Individual Liberty’s Externalities
In many of the First Amendment cases discussed in the previous
Subpart, the beneficiaries of the liberty interest were the proverbial
have-nots. In those cases, the social cost, or externality, of
accommodating the downtrodden’s liberty interest was slight and easily
303
absorbed by the state. Consider the costs: the minimal disruption to
Mary Beth Tinker’s classroom; the lack of decorum from Cohen’s “Fuck
the Draft” jacket; the frustration of the selective service process from
draft card burning (this more weighty impact was found to be sufficient
to suppress the speech interest); the cost to the reputation of L.B.
Sullivan who could not pursue his libel suit; and the State of Alabama
that could not access the membership roster of the NAACP. For free
exercise, the costs were even more minimal: providing unemployment
benefits to Sherbert the Seventh-Day Adventist; accepting that the
Amish youth would suffer from a lack of education; not having a public
notary swear to god; and having to pay benefits to Alfred Smith who

301. Collins, supra note 190.
302. Id.
303. See Blackman, supra note 112, for a discussion of the “social cost” of constitutional rights.
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ingested peyote, notwithstanding drug laws. In all cases, the costs were
small and were absorbed by the state, not third parties.
Where are we today? The costs are greater and are inflicted on
private parties. Groups like Citizens United can seek contributions from
profitable corporations to influence public opinion and shape the
outcome of elections. Millionaires like Shaun McCutcheon, and even
billionaires, can make contributions to as many political races as they
wish, no longer subject to an aggregate cap. Professor Tim Wu stated the
issue succinctly with respect to the First Amendment: “Once the patron
saint of protesters and the disenfranchised, the First Amendment has
become the darling of economic libertarians and corporate lawyers who
have recognized its power to immunize private enterprise from legal
304
restraint.” With respect to free exercise, corporations like Hobby Lobby
are not required to provide insurance covering emergency contraceptives
for their female employees. Under the Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) accommodation, the insurance companies pick up that bill and
that cost is ultimately passed onto government and taxpayers. Unlike the
religious accommodation cases of days gone by, today’s accommodations
impose social costs on nonbelievers.
The New York Times summarized the reversal:
An informal coalition of liberals and conservatives endorsed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it seemed to protect
members of vulnerable religious minorities from punishment for the
exercise of their beliefs. [. . .] But over time, court decisions and
conservative legal initiatives started to change the meaning of those
laws, according to liberal activists. The state laws were not used to
protect minorities, these critics say, but to allow some religious groups
305
to undermine the rights of women, gays and lesbians or other groups.

The New York Times quoted Eunice Rho, an ACLU lawyer, who
306
noted the “coalition broke apart over the civil rights issues.” Stated
differently, the civil rights issue of equality trumped the civil liberties
issue of free exercise. Consider the next wave of cases that will test the
intersection of religious freedom and equality: RFRA as applied to
antidiscrimination laws.
1. RFRA and Discrimination
307

After City of Boerne v. Flores invalidated the federal RFRA as
applied to the federal government, nineteen states enacted local RFRAs

304. Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment,
New Republic (June 2, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijackedfirst-amendment-evade-regulation.
305. Erik Eckholm, Religious Protection Laws, Once Called Shields, Are Now Seen as Cudgels,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 2015, at A12.
306. Id.
307. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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that were substantially similar to the federal law. One of the biggest
questions over both the federal and state RFRAs concerns whether they
can be used as a defense in a private cause of action where the
government is not a party. In other words, could a private party, when
sued under some law of general applicability, seek an accommodation
from the court by claiming that the enforcement of the law would impose
a “substantial burden” on her exercise of religion. This issue has divided
the federal courts. The Second, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits held
that RFRA could be used as a defense; the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
309
held that it could not.
In 1996—three years after RFRA was enacted—the D.C. Circuit
held that the Catholic University of America could raise RFRA as a
defense against a sex discrimination claim brought by a nun and the
310
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alike. In
1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a church could
311
assert RFRA as a defense against a trustee in bankruptcy proceedings.
In a 2000 decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, one church
sued another church for unlawfully using materials copyrighted by its late
312
pastor. The court allowed the infringing church to raise the defense,
but found that the application of the copyright law did not impose a
“substantial burden” on its exercise of religion.
In a 2005 decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a priest
was forced to retire by the New York Methodist Church when he turned
313
seventy. The priest brought an age discrimination claim, and the
Church countered that enforcing the law would burden its religious
exercise. The Second Circuit found that “RFRA’s language surely seems
broad enough to encompass” the Church raising RFRA as a defense
314
against the age discrimination claim. In short, Judge Ralph Winter
wrote that RFRA “easily covers” the Church’s claim that applying the
antidiscrimination law could “substantially burden” its exercise of
315
religion.
These four cases, and many others, concerned similar facts—private
parties brought suits against corporations. (Yes, Catholic University and
churches are corporations.) In each case, the corporate defendants were

308. Hunter Schwarz, 19 States That Have ‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Like Indiana’s That No One
Is Boycotting, Wash. Post (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/03/
27/19-states-that-have-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-is-boycotting/.
309. Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits
by Private Plaintiffs, 99 Va. L.R. 343, 344 (2013).
310. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
311. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1998).
312. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2000).
313. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2006).
314. Id. at 103.
315. Id. at 103–04.

Blackman-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

670

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2016 10:18 PM

[Vol. 67:623

allowed to raise RFRA as a defense to assert that the enforcement of
federal law—Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination, bankruptcy
law, and even trademark law—burdened their religious exercise. In some
cases, the defenses were successful, and in most they were not. This is the
rule of law in virtually half the states in the union under the jurisdiction
of these four circuits—and until recently, it was not particularly
controversial.
Joining the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits in finding that
RFRA can be asserted as a defense in a private cause of action was the
Justice Department. In August of 2012, the U.S. Government stated that
Wheaton College, if sued by an employee for failing to provide
contraceptives under the ACA’s mandate, “in its defense of such an
action, would have an opportunity to raise its contention that the
316
contraceptive coverage requirement violates” RFRA. (Granted, this
position was taken before the Court made clear that RFRA extends to
for-profit corporations, a position the Justice Department opposed.)
But not everyone agreed. Taking the opposing view was then-circuit
judge and now-Justice Sotomayor, who dissented in the Second Circuit’s
317
Methodist Church case. She found that RFRA “does not apply to
318
disputes between private parties.” Second Circuit Judge Ralph Winter
responded forcefully to Sotomayor’s suggestion: “The [dissent’s]
narrowing interpretation—permitting the assertion of the RFRA as a
defense only when relief is also sought against a governmental party—
involves a convoluted drawing of a hardly inevitable negative
implication. If such a limitation was intended, Congress chose a most
awkward way of inserting it.”
Joining Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting view are the Sixth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. Shruti Chaganti dubs these courts the
“non-defense circuits” that held that RFRA was meant to “provide a
defense only when obtaining appropriate relief against a government and
319
therefore cannot apply to suits in which the government is not a party.”
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the “Creation
Seventh Day Adventist Church” could not raise RFRA as a defense in a
trademark infringement suit brought by the “Seventh-Day Adventist
320
Church.” In 2006, weighing in for the Seventh Circuit was the
ubiquitous Judge Richard Posner. In this age discrimination claim

316. Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703
F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01169-ESH).
317. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 109 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
318. Id.
319. Chaganti, supra note 309, at 344.
320. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410–11 (6th Cir. 2010).
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brought by an organist against a Catholic Diocese, Posner wrote, “RFRA
321
is applicable only to suits to which the government is a party.”
The state courts, like the federal courts, have also wrestled over
whether state RFRAs can be raised as defense in private suits. Most
notable among these decisions is the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
322
opinion in Elane Photography v. Wilcox. In this now famous case, as
Justice Ginsburg described it in her Hobby Lobby dissent, a “for-profit
photography business owned by a husband and wife refused to
photograph a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony based on the
religious beliefs of the company’s owners,” and was fined by the state
323
Human Rights Commission as a result. The Land of Enchantment’s
high court, mirroring Sotomayor and Posner’s narrow reading, concluded
that the photographer could not raise the state RFRA as a defense
against a discrimination claim. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review this case.
This brings us to the Hoosier State. Section 9 of Indiana’s
controversial RFRA provides that “[a] person whose exercise of religion
has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened,
by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding,
regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a
324
party to the proceeding.” In the wake of Elane Photography, the
Indiana RFRA made explicit for its own laws what the four federal
courts of appeals and the Obama Justice Department already recognized
about the federal counterpart. Indiana’s RFRA does no more than codify
that the private enforcement of public laws—including discrimination
claims—can be defended against with free exercise rights.
Neither the Indiana, nor federal RFRA provides automatic
immunity to discrimination claims. It only allows a defendant to raise a
defense, which a finder of fact must consider and balance against the
325
Similar
state’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.
analyses pertain to other defenses that can be raised under Title VII, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Americans with
Disabilities Act. In 2012, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
“ministerial exception” prevents a teacher from bringing a disability
326
discrimination suit against her employer, a Church. But what RFRA

321. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
322. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
323. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014)).
324. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-13-9-9 (West 2015).
325. Id.; Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4).
326. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–07 (2012).
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does do is create the opportunity—though slim—for courts to carve out
further exemptions from generally applicable discrimination laws. The
327
threat of this happening yielded a massive backlash against the law. As
Eugene Volokh notes, “once broadly supported, [RFRAs] are now
controversial. Many people, chiefly on the left, have criticized such laws,
in large part on the grounds that RFRAs might let religious objectors
claim exemptions from antidiscrimination law—especially with regard to
328
state and local laws that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation.”
While the concern was overstated in light of how RFRA has been
enforced for twenty years, the specter of exempting discrimination claims
was raised by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith, and promptly
discounted by Justice O’Connor’s dissent. Scalia’s collectivist free
exercise right would offer no refuge for discrimination defenses. But the
dissent’s individual right could permit this imposition of social cost on
nonbelievers, even in the form of discriminations.
First, as a threshold matter, the four courts of appeals that
interpreted RFRA as providing a defense in a private cause of action
have a plausible claim that they are acting consistently with Sherbert. As
Volokh observes, “the old Sherbert-era Free Exercise Clause would
329
surely have applied to such private lawsuits as well.” Only one year
after Sherbert, the Court decided the landmark case of New York Times
330
Co. v. Sullivan —again a corporation exercising First Amendment
rights—holding that the First Amendment could be raised as a defense
331
against a libel suit, even where the government is not a party. Justice
Brennan, author of both the Sherbert and Sullivan opinions, wrote, “It
matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
332
whether such power has in fact been exercised.” Brennan explains,
“What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
333
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”
The law applies equally to private and public causes of action. Because of
327. Ironically, many corporations used corporate funds to oppose this law—the exact behavior
the government asserted it could prohibit in Citizens United. Josh Blackman, Could Indiana Block
Corporations from Using Corporate Money to Criticize RFRA?, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/03/31/could-indiana-block-corporations-from-using-corporate-moneyto-criticize-rfra/.
328. Volokh, supra note 247.
329. Id.
330. See 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (citations omitted) ((“He brought this civil libel action against
the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and against petitioner The
New York Times Company, a New York corporation which publishes the New York Times, a daily
newspaper.”) (emphasis added)).
331. Id. at 265.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 277.
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the “pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice
to public criticism,” the “civil libel is ‘a form of regulation that creates
hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend
334
reliance upon the criminal law.’” In this sense, civil liberties are even
more in doubt when a private party, rather than the state, can bring a
civil suit.
Volokh explains that Sullivan’s “logic extended beyond that, and
the Court has routinely applied the First Amendment to a wide range of
335
other civil litigation brought by private individuals.” What is true for
the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses of the First Amendment “would
336
surely have been true . . . for the Free Exercise Clause.” Additionally,
337
Shelley v. Kraemer stands for a similar proposition, as a private suit
concerning a racially restricted covenant can be challenged on the
grounds that its judicial enforcement violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Second, it is the Brennan-esque individual notion of free exercise
that allows people of conscience to seek accommodations from generally
applicable laws. In contrast, Smith repudiated that doctrine, and got
courts out of the business of carving out exemptions for faiths. Ironically,
the very same progressives that ridiculed Justice Scalia’s decision to stop
judicially imposed religious accommodation now seek a return to his
equality driven collectivist framework for religious liberty. Volokh wryly
observes: “Justice Scalia’s opinion [in] Employment Division v. Smith left
most religious exemption questions to ‘the political process.’ The modern
338
RFRA skeptics have embraced that.” The irony, Volokh explains, is
that “RFRAs largely implement the religious exemption rules that
Justice Brennan and the ACLU had long argued for—and that Justice
Brennan and the ACLU had sharply criticized Justice Scalia and others
339
for overruling” in Employment Division v. Smith. But what changed?
The beneficiaries of the law and who bore the cost.
Third, Justice Brennan’s opinions specifically countenanced that
religious freedom could be raised as a defense against discrimination, but
courts were “quite capable” of balancing those interests. Among the
340
“parade of horribles” the Smith dissent dismissed, Justice Scalia
mentioned that the Free Exercise Clause could be used to seek
exemptions from “laws providing for equality of opportunity for the

334. Id. at 278.
335. Volokh, supra note 247.
336. Id.
337. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
338. Volokh, supra note 247.
339. Id.
340. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).

Blackman-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

674

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/21/2016 10:18 PM

[Vol. 67:623
341

races.” Scalia referenced Bob Jones University v. United States, that
sought to employ a racially discriminatory admission policy, and prohibit
interracial dating and marriage, while at the same time maintain its tax342
exempt status. Yes, Justice Scalia in overturning Sherbert specifically
worried that parties might seek accommodations for discrimination
based on religious belief.
How did the Smith dissent reply to these charges that the Free
Exercise Clause could permit discrimination? The same way that
supporters of Indiana’s RFRA reply: RFRA only creates a balance
where judges weigh the religious exercise against the state’s compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination. Justice O’Connor explained “that
courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise
jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and
343
competing state interests.”
As the Court held seven years earlier in Bob Jones University, even
though the University could assert an exemption from the tax-exempt
rules for its racially discriminatory standards, the federal government
“has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education . . . [that] substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of
344
tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs.” In
other words, the compelling state interest of eliminating discrimination
trumped religious liberty for the individual. The difficulty of applying the
345
“compelling interest” test was not a reason “to reject” it altogether.
Justice O’Connor was perhaps proven correct that the courts could
346
“strike [a] sensible balance.”
This precise debate reemerged in Hobby Lobby, which considered
whether the ACA’s contraceptive mandate violated the federal RFRA as
347
applied to a closely held for-profit business. During oral arguments,
Justice Kagan asked whether an employer could cite RFRA as a defense,
relying on a “religious objection to sex discrimination laws . . . minimum
348
wage laws . . . [or] child labor laws.” Paul Clement, representing Hobby
Lobby, cited the same “parade of horribles” referenced in Smith:
[E]very item on that list was included in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court in Smith. And Justice O’Connor responded to that in her
separate opinion and she said, look, you’ve got to trust the courts; just

341. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
342. See id. at 889 (citing Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 60304).
343. Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
344. 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
345. Volokh, supra note 247.
346. Id.
347. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
348. Josh Blackman, What About RFRA Challenges to Discrimination Laws?, Josh Blackman’s Blog
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/03/26/what-about-rfra-challenges-to-discrimination-laws/.
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because free exercise claims are being brought
doesn’t mean that the
349
courts can’t separate the sheep from the goats.

In other words, merely raising a defense does not mean the defense will
work.
Justice Alito interjected, and asked Clement, “in all the years since
RFRA has been on the books, has any of these claims involving
350
minimum wage, for example, been brought and have they succeeded?”
Clement replied, “very few of these claims have been brought. Very few
of them have succeeded, and that’s notwithstanding the fact that all of
351
these statutes we’re talking about apply to employers generally.”
Presaging the kerfuffle in the Hoosier State, Kagan contended that if
Hobby Lobby prevails, “religious objectors [will] come out of the
woodwork with respect to all of these laws” and judges’ “hands would be
352
bound when faced with all these challenges.” Presumably, when Kagan
speaks of “religious objectors,” she is not talking about Amish seeking
draft exemptions, or Native Americans seeking to ingest peyote, but
Christians seeking exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.
Following up on this exchange, in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
explained that Hobby Lobby “surely do[es] not stand alone as commercial
enterprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the
353
basis of their religious beliefs.” Ginsburg asks, “Would RFRA require
exemptions in cases of this ilk? And if not, how does the Court divine
which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which are
354
not?” Was this not the exact question Justice Scalia posed to the Smith
dissenters, and that Justice O’Connor shrugged off explaining courts
were “quite capable” of balancing these interests? The déjà vu, between
right and left, collective and individual, is striking.
To support this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg has to reach far back in
time to find examples where businesses claimed exemptions from
discrimination laws by citing religious exercise, including a district of
South Carolina case from 1966 and a Minnesota Supreme Court case
355
from 1985. Yet, in each case, the court (unsurprisingly) ruled against
the free exercise claim. The district court in South Carolina was not
349. Id.
350. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 16.
353. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2804 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 2805.
355. Id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966) (ruling owner of restaurant chain refusing to serve black patrons based
on his religious beliefs opposing racial integration), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d and modified on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968); State
by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478
U.S. 1015 (1986).
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“impressed by defendant Bessinger’s contention that the judicial
enforcement of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 upon which this suit is predicated violates the free exercise of
his religious beliefs in contravention of the First Amendment to the
356
Constitution.” The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the claim that a
sports clubs owners’ “sincere belief” and “interpretation of the Bible”
allowed them to not employ “individuals living with but not married to a
person of the opposite sex; a young, single woman working without her
father’s consent or a married woman working without her husband’s
357
consent . . . [and] fornicators and homosexuals.” Neither case supports
Justice Ginsburg’s fear.
The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby by Justice Alito promptly
dispatched this point: “The principal dissent raises the possibility that
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be
358
cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction.” Justice Alito
rejects this reasoning, noting that “Our decision today provides no such
359
shield.” Consistent with how the Court characterized Bob Jones in
Smith, Alito explained that “[t]he Government has a compelling interest
in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without
regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely
360
tailored to achieve that critical goal.” In other words, no amount of
tailoring could ever permit the government to accommodate racial
discrimination. These sorts of religious accommodations will never result
in the social cost of permitting discrimination, the majority states.
Notably, Justice Alito does not mention, gender, sexual orientation, or
any other protected statuses.
Herein lies the dichotomy between speech and religion. While the
conservatives on the Court profess that the freedom of expression cannot
be left to the whims of the “political process,” the same conservatives
held that the freedom of exercise could be left to those whims. However,
RFRA transforms free exercise back into the individual right for Justice
Scalia and others. Meanwhile the liberals on the Court profess that the
freedom of expression must be left to the higher goals of “collective
speech” and at the same time they insist that the courts balance the
intrusions on freedom of exercise when they conflict with the goals of the
states.

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Newman, 256 F. Supp. at 945.
State by McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 847.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
Id.
Id.
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2. The Social Costs of Free Exercise
The perception of how Indiana’s RFRA would be perceived was
premised on the social costs it imposes onto others, or more ominously,
how future (state) courts could interpret the RFRA in light of the
Court’s (imminent) ruling on same-sex marriage. In an important new
article on religious liberty, Professors Douglas Nejaime and Reva Siegel
compare and contrast the old “free exercise cases that RFRA invokes”
with the new “complicity-based conscience claims” relied on by Hobby
361
Lobby. Unlike the cases of days gone by, the modern species of free
exercise cases will impose significant externalities on those who do not
share the same faith. Nejaime and Siegel explain that traditionally
RFRA “claims were advanced by religious minorities who sought
exemptions based on unconventional beliefs generally not considered by
lawmakers when they adopted the challenged laws; the costs of
362
accommodating their claims were minimal and widely shared.” In
contrast, the “complicity-based conscience claims” of today “harm those
363
whose conduct the claimants view as sinful.”
This view has gained extra salience in the aftermath of Indiana’s
RFRA experiment, and especially so after the Supreme Court’s decision
364
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges.
Professor Friedman explains, “Since Hobby Lobby and the explosion of
same-sex marriage cases, it is largely the Christian majority . . . that
asserts it is the victim of the majoritarian process, seeking exemptions
that have a negative impact on minority groups that have broadly been
365
the victims of past governmental discrimination.” Professor Dale
Carpenter puts a fine point on this theory: “What started out as a shield
for minority religious practitioners like Native Americans and the Amish
366
is in danger of being weaponized into a sword against civil rights.” Not
only has RFRA been turned on its head, they argue, but also the victims
of these accommodations are minorities and disadvantaged groups.
Professor Michael Dorf similarly explained, “although the federal
RFRA was inspired by a case involving a minority religion, RFRAs lately
been used [sic] by people who adhere to conservative branches of

361. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2520 (2015).
362. Id. at 2520.
363. Id.
364. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). For a discussion of Obergefell, see Josh
Blackman & Howard Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 Hastings Const. L.Q. 243
(2016).
365. Friedman, supra note 289.
366. Dale Carpenter, The Clash of “Religious Freedom” and Civil Rights in Indiana, Wash. Post
(Mar. 30, 2015) (emphasis added), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/
03/30/the-clash-of-religious-freedom-and-civil-rights-in-indiana/.
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367

mainstream religions.” The necessary consequence of increasing the
“number of people who seek eligibility for a RFRA exemption,” Dorf
notes, is the “burden of providing accommodations becomes more
368
concentrated.” Dorf adds, “the cost of the accommodation now falls on
a non-believing subset of the population who are either themselves a
minority or, if a majority, a bare one—at least in particular
369
communities.” In other words, accommodating Native Americans
seeking to ingest peyote pales in comparison with accommodating
Christian corporations who oppose paying for abortifacients. So instead
of “virtually the whole community absorbing the marginally small cost of
providing an accommodation to a handful of people with idiosyncratic
religious beliefs”—such as Native-American peyote use—“in the new
contexts a RFRA begins to look like it enables one large faction of the
370
population impose its religious beliefs on the rest of the population.”
With this understanding, Dorf concludes, “liberals, who hold antiEstablishment values much more strongly than conservatives do, have
371
another reason to be wary of RFRAs.” Professors Nejaime and Siegel
explain that “few would affirm a result in which some citizens are singled
372
out to bear significant costs of another’s religious exercise.”
The analogies between speech and religion are pronounced. With
speech, many progressives fear that powerful, corporate interests can
utilize the First Amendment to inflict negative externalities on groups
with less means. This approach distorts the political process and
democracy. Similarly, with religion, the liberal fear is that powerful,
Christian interests can utilize RFRA to inflict negative externalities on
disadvantaged groups. This approach distorts the political process and
equality. In both cases, groups adverse to progressive goals are relying on
constitutional individual liberties to harm others and thwart social
justice. And because these groups are so much larger than the proverbial
protestors burning draft cards or Native Americans ingesting peyote, the
costs are far more concentrated.
Conservatives, on the other hand—perhaps because of the changing
demographics of who religious and speech liberties protect today—view
both forms of liberty as essential to protect as rights unto themselves. But
even then, instrumental to the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby, and in
particular Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, was the fact that the
government could accommodate Hobby Lobby’s objection without

367. Michael Dorf, How RFRA Is like a Taking and Two Thoughts on Establishment, Dorf on L.
(Apr. 8, 2015) (emphasis added), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/04/how-rfra-is-like-taking-and-two.html.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 361, at 2521.

Blackman_23 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete)

April 2016]

COLLECTIVE LIBERTY

3/21/2016 10:18 PM

679

imposing any additional cost on its employees. According to the
majority, the government simply passes the cost onto the insurance
companies. (In reality, the insurance companies pass this cost onto
consumers one way or the other, but we will accept this fuzzy math for
argument’s sake.) Had the government been unable to accommodate
Hobby Lobby without imposing costs on others, it is possible the calculus
might have gone the other way. In this sense, the distance between the
liberals and conservatives on RFRA might not be as broad as the gap
with respect to free speech.
C. The Purpose of Liberty
What is the purpose of judicial protection of liberty? Does it exist
unto itself, based on the idea that people who are free to choose will
make the best decisions? Or, does it exist so long as it promotes the
processes that will yield the “best” decisions for society? The problems
inherent in each choice are apparent, and well-documented. For the former,
people—not homo economicus—when left to their own devices, often make
bad decisions that harm others. Here, liberty often yields inequality. For
the latter, elites who decide what the “best” decisions are stifle autonomy
and prevent individuals from deciding how to live their own lives. The
desire for equality trumps liberty.
With respect to free expression, the individualistic view that “speech
is speech” is premised on the notion that more speech is better, and that
with more information, people will be able to make the best decisions for
their flourishing. The collectivist view rejects this naïveté, and contends
that the state has a strong interest in eliminating the externalities from
harmful speech. For free exercise, the individualistic view holds that faith
is central to our civic society, and that government should avoid
substantially burdening exercise whenever feasible, even if it shifts a cost
onto society. The collectivist view counters that allowing exemptions for
faith harms nonbelievers who do not enjoy the equal application of the
law, even if religious exercise is burdened. The individualistic view is
more willing to embrace liberty, while the collectivist view is grounded in
promoting equality.
The final inquiry to explain the shift from the individual to the
collective is to understand how judicial protection of rights impacts
liberty and equality. For speech, the failed experiment over the marketplace
of ideas—where powerful voices drowned out the underprivileged—
resulted in a change to promote political equality, rather than allowing
speech to flow freely. For exercise, the transition from minority faiths
seeking minor exemptions to majority faiths seeking substantial exemptions
vitiated the importance of religion in society, to the extent that it interferes
with policies of social justice.
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1. The Failed Speech Experiment
Has the left left the First Amendment? Or has the First Amendment
left the left? The divide within the ACLU suggests it might be a little bit
of both. Consider the explanation of Neuborne, who writes that many
progressives primarily supported free speech because they believed the
marketplace of ideas would yield progressive goals, such as social and
373
political equality. Through the early parts of the “twentieth century,”
Neuborne recalls, “left-wing reformers, certain that their ideas were on
the winning side of history, viewed robust free speech as an agent of
374
change capable of destabilizing an oppressive and unequal status quo.”
In order to ensure that antiestablishment views—which the left was
certain were the true and right ideals—were protected, other, less
desirable forms of speech would receive similar scrutiny. It was worth it.
This was the progressive experiment: “To the reformist American left,
375
more speech meant more—and faster—social and economic change.”
The road to progressive utopia was paved with more speech. As
Neuborne weighed the calculus, “[t]he future potential impact of a
deregulatory First Amendment on the weak and the poor was deemed a
small price to pay for the ability to invoke a robust free speech principle
today in support of a more equal world.” With a majority on the Court,
“the American left breathed a sigh of relief and awaited its inevitable
376
triumph.” Giving protection to commercial speech was well worth the
cost to promote equality. Or, at least, that was how the experiment was
designed.
But at the height of the Pax Supremana where speech was protected
by the right and left, Neuborne explains, liberals realized something was
amiss. “By 1990, some progressives began to suspect that they had made
377
a bad First Amendment bargain.” The deal was not what they
expected. What did they gain? Protection for “the rights of a couple of
scruffy kids to burn flags” and “tepid protection for carefully constrained
378
street demonstrations.” What did they lose from this grand pact? A lot
more. The First Amendment now protected “uncontrolled campaign
spending by the superrich—including corporations,” the “concentration
of media power in a handful of huge corporations,” and “bursts of verbal
venom aimed at historically weak hearers seeking access to education

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Neuborne, supra note 38, at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 114.
Id.
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and decent housing.” This outcome was “hardly a prescription for
380
progress.”
Neuborne cynically suggests that many liberals joined the free
speech experiment with the hopes that it would yield progressive goals,
and not because they believed in the civil libertarian grounds for
protecting “speech as speech.” Rather than the harmful speech being a
necessary and ancillary evil to achieve the progressive society, the tail
began to wag the dog, and it ran amok. Before they knew it, the liberals
were bamboozled. “By 2000, the First Amendment era of good feelings
was over, but not before the bipartisan coalition had generated an
enormously powerful body of precedent establishing an imperial Free
381
Speech Clause.”
The marketplace of ideas was a bold experiment. Speech was
protected on the premise that if all voices were heard, the “best” idea
would prevail. But what if this experiment turned out to be a failure? Or,
what if liberals were wrong about what was actually “best”? Rather than
serving as a marketplace, the arena of ideas turned into an auction, with
the most powerful speech going to the highest bidder. This might explain
why in McCutcheon, Justice Breyer could not bring himself to cite
Holmes’s Abrams dissent as he no longer believed the experiment was
worth trying. What if the incidental protection of those ancillary harmful
expressions began to drown out the true, progressive ideals? What if
speech was used not to promote the left’s “strong, redistributive
government,” but rather the resurgent right’s “skeptical, deregulatory
382
approach to government.” Speech, no longer serving the objectives of
the collective, was no longer worthy of robust protection. Neuborne,
perhaps speaking autobiographically of other similarly inclined liberals,
began to realize that speech wasn’t serving the goals of political equality.
Therefore, long-standing precedents on speech became expendable.
A new framework was needed to ensure that the good speech
continued, but the bad speech was regulated. Only that speech which
promotes the progressive goals of “democracy” warrant scrutiny, and
everything else can be cast aside. Deciding which speech does and does
not serve democracy provides a judicial bypass to exclude interests
inconsistent with social justice. This is the essence of “collective speech.”
Perhaps Breyer’s shirking away from the First Amendment reflects what
Neuborne sees as liberals who “began to view the bipartisan era as a
Faustian bargain, far more likely to reinforce the status quo than
383
destabilize it.” Returning to the progressive ideals of protecting speech
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115.
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as a utilitarian concern, the argument goes, can get the country back on
the right progressive track.
But what about conservatives? The left was not alone with this shift,
Neuborne posits. There was a time when “robust First Amendment”
384
protection was the “bête noire of the American right.” Protecting the
speech rights of hippies opposing the war and burning draft cards was a
threat to the establishment, and threatened to drown out the message of
social unity they preached. These conservatives, “appalled by the
excesses of fascist lunatics . . . and confronted by an almost unbroken
phalanx of academic support for leftist programs, did not look to the
385
future with intellectual confidence.” For this generation of post-WWII
conservatives promoted a “weak First Amendment,” shielding the
386
country from the “likelihood of harm” posed by speech. While the left
awaited their victory, “[t]he right hunkered down and vowed to fight on
387
the beaches.” Though, armed with vigorous scrutiny and doctrine,
conservatives settled in nicely with the modern First Amendment.
Today, the precedent exists to offer robust protections for all speech,
regardless of whether it is consistent with democracy or political equality.
2. Conscience and Equality
The identities of the beneficiaries of religious accommodations and
who bears the burden of those accommodations can only explain in part
the free exercise divide. Underlying these issues is the bedrock issue of
the value of religion itself. As one scholar recently asked in a provocative
388
book, why tolerate religion at all? The evolution of thought with
respect to free exercise must be assessed against the background
principles: What is the intrinsic value of faith itself? And how does that
compare to the costs it inflicts on nonbelievers? If religion does not need
to be tolerated, then the accommodation question is easily answered.
Justice Breyer has explained that speech does not exist in a vacuum,
and is protected so long as the democratic process deems its costs
tolerable. The Hobby Lobby dissent, though not quite reaching this
conclusion, can justify a similar understanding of free exercise.
Conscience is not a value onto itself, but is protected so long as the
democratic process deems its costs tolerable. Once you adopt this vision
of religion, it becomes simple to disregard the intrinsic value of faith, in
much the same way that the intrinsic value of speech gets brushed aside
by Breyer. If the competing interests are mandating employer-provided

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion (2013).
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contraceptives and not requiring a profitable company to pay for those
products, discounting the value of faith makes this balance a lot easier.
Professor Mark DeGirolami points out that “[o]ne might have
thought, even relatively recently, that religious freedom was a ‘civil
389
right.’ But no longer: it is now said to be the enemy of ‘civil rights.’”
Stated succinctly by Professor Rick Garnett,
[T]he conversation about how to manage the conflict between some
religious-liberty claims and some equality and non-discrimination
claims has to proceed from an appreciation for the facts that “religious
liberty” *is* a civil right and that the enterprise of protecting
civil
390
rights includes—it has to include—care for religious liberty.

If religion is only valued so long as it serves utilitarian goals, then religion
inconsistent with principles of equality or social justice, need not be
391
protected. This is the crystallization of “collective liberty.”
One of the clearest examples of this shift concerns whether the
federal, state, and local governments should continue to offer tax-exempt
392
status to institutions that do not sanction same-sex marriage. During
oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Alito asked the Solicitor
General whether religious institutions that do not recognize same-sex
marriage could keep their tax-exempt status—alluding to the Court’s
393
earlier decision in Bob Jones. The Solicitor General answered, in what
might be the understatement of the decade, “it’s certainly going to be an
issue.” In the wake of Obergefell, a provocative editorial took up the
Solicitor General’s prediction and argued that religious institutions that

389. Marc DeGirolami, “Weaponizing”, Mirror of Just. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
mirrorofjustice/2015/04/weaponizing.html.
390. Rick Garnett, Religious Freedom “Among,” Not “Against,” Civil Rights, Mirror of Just. (Apr. 1,
2015), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/04/religious-freedom-among-not-against-civilrights.html.
391. During oral arguments in Obergefell, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli would not deny that a
religious university could lose its tax exempt status if it opposed same-sex marriage. Transcript of Oral
Argument, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556).
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in the Bob Jones case, the Court held that a college was not
entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial marriage or interracial dating. So
would the same apply to a university or a college if it opposed same-sex marriage?
GENERAL VERRILLI: You know, I—I don’t think I can answer that question without
knowing more specifics, but it’s certainly going to be an issue. I—I don’t deny that. I don’t
deny that, Justice Alito. It is—it is going to be an issue.
Id. at 38.
392. The Washington Post’s Wonkblog estimated that this subsidy amounts to roughly $83 billion
per year. Dylan Matthews, You Give Religions More than $82.5 Billion a Year, Wonkblog (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/22/you-give-religions-more-than-825-billion-a-year/.
393. Adam J. White, Obama Admin: Religious Organizations Could Lose Tax-Exempt Status If
Supreme Court Creates Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage, Wkly. Standard (Apr. 29, 2015,
2:05 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/934127.
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discriminate against LGBT people should lose their tax-exempt status.
A recent survey revealed that forty percent of Americans and fifty-two
percent of Democrats oppose granting tax-exempt status for religious
395
organizations.
This trend shows no sign of abating. Looking forward to the year
2050, “the spread of secularism will probably continue,” as “those who
claim no religion will make up about a quarter of the population,” up
396
from sixteen percent in 2010. As this influential demographic expands,
the political protection of faith will fade into the twilight. This decline
will be accelerated by the Supreme Court’s recognition that “moral
397
disapproval” is no longer a rational basis to enact social legislation.
Even in the absence of a demographic shift, views toward religious
accommodations have, and will change. “Without change in numbers or
belief, religious actors can shift from speaking as a majority seeking to
enforce traditional morality to speaking as a minority seeking exemptions
398
from laws that offend traditional morality.” During his recent visit to the
United States, Pope Francis aptly summarized the evolution: “Until
recently, we lived in a social context where the similarities between the
civil institution of marriage and the Christian sacrament were considerable
and shared. The two were interrelated and mutually supportive. This is no
399
longer the case.”
400
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, though not a free exercise
case, demonstrates the new approach to the First Amendment. Allowing
an “all-comers” policy that is inclusive of everyone, regardless of who
they are—is not only socially desirable as a matter of policy, but also
constitutionally required under the First Amendment. In this new
normal, the only religious beliefs that are acceptable by society are those
401
that tolerate everyone equal. Individual exercise that does not coincide

394. Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time to End Tax Exemptions for Religious Institutions, Time (June
28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/.
395. Josh Blackman, 40% of Americans, 52% Democrats, Oppose Tax-Exemptions for Religious
Organizations, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Sept. 27, 2015), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/09/27/40of-americans-52-of-democrats-oppose-tax-exemptions-for-religious-organizations/.
396. Laurie Goodstein, Muslims Projected to Outnumber Christians by 2100, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
2015, at A14.
397. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (rejecting “moral disapproval” as a
rationale to justify DOMA); cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015).
398. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 361, at 138.
399. Howard Friedman, Pope Francis Addresses Clergy Sex Abuse and New Definitions of Marriage,
Religion Clause (Sept. 27, 2015), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2015/09/pope-francis-addressesclergy-sex-abuse.html.
400. 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
401. See Yossi Nehushtan, Intolerant Religion in a Tolerant-Liberal Democracy 1 (2015)
(“The . . . purpose of this book is to explain why religion should not be tolerated in a tolerant-liberal
democracy. The more focused and explicit purpose of the book is to explain why a tolerant-liberal
democracy should be reluctant to tolerate religious claims for accommodation.”).
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with the collective virtues of the state need not be tolerated, and indeed
should be shunned. Increasingly so, the primary goal of society will hew
toward promoting equality rather than guaranteeing exercise. Society’s
perception of Christianity, and other faiths, to the extent that their
beliefs interfere with equality and social justice, will no longer be deemed
worthy of the collective exercise rights of civil society. The concerns
highlighted by Justice O’Connor’s Smith dissent—that the “political
process” could not work things out—have proven true, as the political
process moves away from free exercise and toward political equality. Or,
viewed differently, Justice Scalia’s Smith opinion was vindicated, as the
people, and not the courts can decide the proper scope of religious
accommodations.
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